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PRICING DISCLOSURE:
CROWDFUNDING'S CURIOUS CONUNDRUM
ALAN R. PALMITER*
Securities-financial investments-are weird. It is hard to know what
they are worth. For example, Facebook went public for $38 per share. Why
not $3.80 or $380? Despite being clueless about their value, we buy
securities all the time-directly and indirectly. Did we get a good deal, a
solid investment, a fair price? Or was the price a departure from reality, a
cognitive mistake, a fraud? What are investors told about this esoteric (and
fundamental) question? As we move from highly regulated public offerings
to lightly regulated "crowdfunding," pricing disclosure in securities
offerings-the subject of this article-becomes even more relevant.
In registered securities offerings to the public, investors receive
prospectus disclosure about the pricing of the offered securities. It is the
standard boilerplate that gives no clue of how the price for the offering has
actually been set. Instead, as the standard disclosure intimates, pricing in
such offerings happens behind the scenes in negotiations between the
offering's managing underwriter and the issuer, using various valuation
models, multiples and comparables and indications of market demand. That
is, market intermediaries do the dirty work for public investors to ensure a
modicum of price fairness.
In unregistered private offerings to sophisticated investors, price-related
disclosure arises in the parties' negotiations and happens under the watchful
eye of the antifraud standards of Rule 1Ob-5. Private investors (by virtue of
their superior financial acumen) are assumed to be keenly aware of the
pricing models and multiples that underlie their price negotiations. They
typically receive detailed financial information, but only cursory
explanations (if at all) of the valuation methods and assumptions used in
pricing of the offered securities. This pricing disclosure reflects the general
attitude in a private placement that investors are "on their own."
In between these two methods of capital formation have been
unregistered offerings to public investors-a wrinkle allowed under special
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SEC exemptions for small offerings of less than $5 million (recently raised
to $50 million by the JOBS Act). Here the SEC requires additional pricing
disclosure, reflecting the agency's view that there is no way unsophisticated
investors can apply a DCF/CAPM analysis (whatever that means) to price a
securities offering. But companies have hardly used these exemptions
because they are chock-full of potholes, including liability concerns and a
costly patchwork of state regulation.
But all of this changed earlier this year when Congress passed and
President Obama signed the JOBS Act. JOBS is the Orwellian acronym for
Jumpstart Our Business Startups, based on the legislation's questionable
assumption that small businesses will hire new employees if the companies
have greater access to securities investors. Among other things, the new law
allows small companies to raise capital on the Internet-through something
called crowdfunding-without the need for audited financials, compendious
disclosure documents or typical underwriters.
To prevent the new law from becoming a license for securities scams,
there are some interesting (and as yet untested) protections. For one,
companies seeking crowdfunding can raise capital only through a securities
firm or Internet portal; direct offerings by issuers are not allowed. For
another, these intermediaries are to provide investors with "investor
education" materials to prepare them for the risks of this new kind of
investing. Finally, the new law creates a lower negligence threshold for
antifraud liability, which applies both to the company raising the capital and
the securities firm or portal serving as intermediary.
So here is the question for this article: what kind of price disclosure
should companies (and their intermediaries) provide unsophisticated
investors in a crowdfunding when the Internet starts to buzz with promises
of "the next Google" or a local winery simply looks for funding beyond its
local bank? My answer: in this context, the SEC in creating its
crowdfunding disclosure rules and judges (or others who might resolve
crowdfunding fraud claims) should see information on securities
valuation/pricing as "material" (even "highly material") and treat as
fraudulent any failure by companies (and their intermediaries) to tell
investors how they came up with a price of $20/share or an interest rate of
12.3%. Not only will crowdfunding investors receive some assurance that
the price they paid was connected to reality, but business entrepreneurs and
crowdfunding intermediaries will be put through the steps of thinking about
the offering and its price. That is, meaningful pricing disclosure in a
crowdfunding-both as a matter of investor protection and to ensure
efficient capital formation by small business-must get into the nitty-gritty
of valuation methods and assumptions used in the offering. And, to be
relevant to the reasonable crowdfunding investor, it's gotta be in plain
English.
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Simple enough. But there is a conundrum. Crowdfunding, as prescribed
in the JOBS Act, can happen only in small packages-essentially capped at
$500,000 per offering given the requirement of an audit for offerings above
this amount. Thus, even if the SEC and the courts accept my premise that
pricing disclosure has to be ramped up for crowdfunding, it is unclear how
enforcement of this heightened disclosure regime would happen. Public
enforcement by the SEC would likely happen only in egregious cases, in
view of the agency's limited resources and political preference to go after
high-profile cases. Private enforcement by aggrieved investors would be a
stretch, given the necessarily small amounts involved. The largest recovery
in a crowdfunding fraud-at least under the federal securities laws-would
likely be $500,000, hardly justifying the attention of most class action
lawyers.
So another necessary component of an effective regime of investor
protection in crowdfunding, beyond meaningful standards of pricing
disclosure, is a set of enforcement mechanisms less daunting and thus more
effective than court litigation. Arbitration comes to mind. But this may be a
panacea. Arbitration, predictably, would be designed by, for and of
securities firms and the new crowdfunding portals-the repeat players in
the game. Certainly, there is reason for caution given the way customer-
broker arbitration has been captured by brokerage firms. More realistic may
be some "guarantee" service offered by securities firms and the portals. In
some respects, this was the solution (heightened liability for underwriters
and auditors) devised in the Securities Act of 1933 to revive investor
confidence in public offerings after the previous big financial crisis.
Here is how this article proceeds. First, I look at the dreary,
parthenogenetic topic of the disclosure of pricing and valuation in securities
offerings. I describe the SEC rules on the information investors receive
about how securities have been priced-in registered public offerings,
unregistered private placements and unregistered offerings to public
investors. Second, I consider how the current liability schemes for securities
offerings deal with false or misleading information about securities pricing,
with particular attention to how liability hinges on investor sophistication.
Third, I review the JOBS Act's disclosure and investor education
provisions applicable in a crowdfunding offering, particularly regarding
pricing issues. I then assert that the Act's new liability provisions should be
understood to compel detailed (and investor-friendly) disclosure-as well
as meaningful investor education-on the pricing of securities sold in a
crowdfunding. Finally, I consider how such a liability scheme might work
in practice, suggesting alternatives to court litigation to ensure full and fair
pricing disclosure to crowdfunding investors.
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I. PRICING DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES OFFERINGS
SEC disclosure rules reflect the bifurcated regulatory world for
securities offerings. Encompassing disclosure is generally required when
securities are sold to public investors, while light (or even no) disclosure is
the order of the day when securities are sold to private investors.
Issuers in registered offerings to public investors must disclose
information about how the offered securities have been priced-particularly
in offerings (such as initial public offerings) without a prior market.
Although the SEC once urged issuers to describe the valuation methods
behind their pricing decision, the SEC has come to accept a mostly
desultory (boilerplate) listing of pricing factors. The assumption-though
not articulated-seems to be that in registered offerings the presence of a
managing underwriter and institutional investors makes meaningful pricing
disclosure unnecessary. When such intermediation is not present, as in
penny-stock offerings and offerings by blank-check companies, the SEC
has required more fulsome pricing disclosure.
In unregistered public offerings, the SEC seems to assume that
sophisticated investors can figure out whether an offering's pricing is fair.
The SEC has not considered-in any analysis or study of investor
behavior-how investors actually receive and process pricing disclosure. In
unregistered public offerings, SEC rules give cursory and inconsistent
recognition to the special needs of public investors in such offerings for
pricing disclosure. The SEC, however, has noted the relevance in these
offerings that intermediation may not be available in setting the offering's
price.
In practice, issuers offer minimal disclosure on the pricing decision. In
registered public offerings, investors receive opaque, boilerplate disclosure
that lists multiple pricing factors, including that pricing happens in
negotiations between the issuer and the managing underwriter. Pricing
disclosure in unregistered offerings to public investors, even when subject
to more demanding SEC disclosure rules, is often unhelpful. Even more
opaque, though, is pricing disclosure in private offerings to which SEC
disclosure rules do not apply, with issuers sometimes stating that pricing is
a matter of judgment within the issuer's discretion.
A. Pricing Disclosure in Registered Offerings
Item 505(a) of Regulation S-K (Item 505)-as promulgated by the SEC
in 1982-requires issuers of common equity in a registered offering to
"describe the various factors considered in determining ... offering price"
when either (1) there is not an established public trading market, or (2)
there is a material disparity between the offering price of the common
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equity and the market price of outstanding shares of the same class.1 Thus,
SEC disclosure rules require that investors in an initial public offering
(IPO) receive a list of the factors the issuer considered (but not the
valuation method used) in setting the offering price. 2
The requirement that pricingfactors be disclosed, however, represents a
dilution of prior disclosure guidelines--on which Item 505 is generally
based-that called for issuers in an IPO to describe the manner in which the
securities had been priced.3 Disclosure guidelines in the 1970s and 1980s
called on issuers to give an overall valuation of the company and describe
how the company had been valued, with specific reference to the valuation
metrics (such as assets or earnings) that had been used.4
Determination of Offering Price, 17 C.F.R. § 229.505 (2012). The same pricing
disclosure rules apply regardless of the size of the issuer. See Smaller Reporting
Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 8876,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,994, 17 Fed. Reg. 934, 934 (Jan. 4, 2008)
(rescinding Regulation S-B and moving disclosure requirements for small issuers
into Regulation S-K); see also Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release
No. 6924, Exchange Act Release No. 30,468, 50 SEC Docket 1536, 1568 (Mar. 11,
1992). Previously, Item 505 of Regulation S-B, applicable to public offerings by
small issuers, contained the same language as Item 505 of Regulation S-K (Item
505). Id.
2 17 C.F.R. § 229.505.
3 Item 505 was adopted in 1982 and consolidates disclosure guidelines that had
been proposed by the SEC in 1980. See Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and
Proposed Rescission of Guide for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements
and Reports, Securities Act Release No. 6332, 23 SEC Docket 311, 320 (Aug. 18,
1981) [hereinafter Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K] (explaining that Item 505
is the consolidation of paragraphs (a)(8) and (c)(6) of proposed Item 45 of
Securities Release No. 6276). And the proposed guidelines, specifically Proposed
Item 45 dealing with disclosure of securities pricing, came from the now-rescinded
SEC industry guides. See Industry Guide 5-Preparation of Prospectuses, Securities
Act Release No. 6276, Exchange Act Release No. 17,399, 21 SEC Docket 1052,
1079 (Dec. 23, 1980) [hereinafter Guides Release] ("[I]n view of the significance
of the disclosure required by Guide 5 with respect to first-time issues, the
Commission is recommending the notes to Guide 5 which call for disclosure of an
established trading market and the method of determining the offering price of
first-time issues be added to proposed Item 45 . . . ."). The only difference between
Item 505 and the prior pricing-disclosure guideline is that Item 505 refers to
common equity where there is no established market while the prior industry
guideline applied to securities registered for the first time. See Proposed Revision
of Regulation S-K, supra, at 320.
4 The proposed 1980 guidelines were SEC's first major step toward implementing
recommendations by an SEC advisory committee to re-evaluate the agency's rules
and regulations "to 'keep the disclosure requirements current and effective and
prevent the development of an encrusting layer of unnecessary and irrelevant
information."' Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K, supra note 3, at 312 (quoting
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1. Prior Guidelines on Pricing Disclosure
According to pricing disclosure guidelines used by the SEC before its
adoption of Regulation S-K (Reg S-K), disclosure in an IPO was to include
"the manner in which the value of the securities has been estimated... with
an appropriate caveat, e.g., that such assigned value may bear no
relationship to the assets, earnings or other criteria of value applicable to
the registrant."5 Disclosure of the manner by which an offering was priced,
however, was dropped from Item 505 without explanation.6
The earlier SEC disclosure guidelines called on issuers in an IPO to
identify risks of mispricing on the prospectus cover page, with a cross-
reference to detailed disclosure on how the offering price had been
determined.7 These guidelines were intended to discourage the use of stock
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REP.
OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 338 (Comm. Print 1977)); see Guides Release, supra note
3, at 1104.
5 Guides Release, supra note 3, at 1105. The language for Proposed Item 45(e)(2)
seems to be based on similar language in Securities Act Release No. 5396, which
amended Industry Guide 5. Compare Notice of Adoption of Guide 59 and
Amendments to Guides 5 and 16 of the Guides for Preparation and Filing of
Registration Statements Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release
No. 5396, 1 SEC Docket 16, 18 (June 1, 1973) [hereinafter Amendments to Guides
5 and 16] ("Guide 5 is amended by adding thereto, the following paragraphs ....
There also should be included, with appropriate cross reference to disclosure
elsewhere in the prospectus, a statement of the value placed on the outstanding
securities as a result of the estimated price with appropriate caveats as to the
reliability of such estimates. Such disclosure also should include ... reference to
the fact' that such value may bear no relationship to the assets, eamings or other
criteria of value applicable to the registrant."), with Guides Release, supra note 3,
at 1105 (Language of Proposed Item 45(e)(2)(iii)) ("If no market exists for the
subject securities, the manner in which the value of outstanding securities has been
estimated should be set forth, together with appropriate caveat, e.g., that such
assigned value may bear no relationship to the assets, earnings or other criteria of
value applicable to the registrant.").
6 The SEC does not mention Proposed Item 45(e)(2) in later releases revising
proposed items or adopting Item 505. See Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K,
supra note 3 (next SEC release proposing further revisions); Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No.
18,524, 24 SEC Docket 1262 (Mar. 3, 1982).
7 Contents of Prospectuses and to Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration
Statements, Securities Act Release No. 5278, 37 Fed. Reg. 15,985, 15,986 (Aug. 9,
1972). The Note following subsection (g) to Industry Guide 5 required an issuer of
securities for which there has been no previous market to state this fact on the
cover page in connection with identification of risks and they must include a cross-
reference to further discussion in the prospectus regarding determination of
offering price. See id.
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phrases and boilerplate that offered little meaningful information.8 As the
SEC explained, the guidelines required "bare bones statements be amplified
by disclosure of factors that were considered in establishing the offering
price" to indicate the how the price was set by the company or between
negotiations of the company and underwriters. 9
In a 1972 examination of "hot issues," the SEC had commented on the
"important responsibility [of underwriters] in the pricing of securities in an
initial public offering." 10 According to the SEC, the managing underwriter
must assure after due diligence that the price reflects the value of the
securities "giving weight to, among other factors, such fundamentals as the
business, operations, and prospects of the issuer and the nature and
financial condition of the issuer."' 1 Significantly, the SEC recommended
disclosure of the aggregate value of the securities and the relationship of
this estimate to earnings, assets and other criteria of value with respect to
the registrant.12
As the SEC explained, new companies must disclose "the method by
which the price of the offering is to be determined" because "pricing of
securities to be offered by new high risk ventures often results in an
aggregate value placed on the outstanding shares ... which bear little or no
relationship to the issuer's assets, earnings, or other criteria of value."' 3 For
example, the agency suggested issuers should give "some explanation...
as to . . . whether a higher price to the public [compared to that paid by
insiders] is based on subsequent financial progress or businessdevelopments. 14
8 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 39TH ANNUAL REPORT, at 13 (1973) (Guide 5 . .. as
amended, notes that stock phrases or 'boiler plate' relating to subjects such as the
company's chances of success or competition often do not often provide
meaningful disclosure ... ").
9 Amendments to Guides 5 and 16, supra note 5, at 16.
10 Hot Issues, Securities Act Release No. 5274, Exchange Act Release No. 9670, 37
Fed. Reg. 16,005, 16,006 (July 26, 1972).
"1 Id.
12 See id. at 16,008. This language seems to be the foundation of the language used
in Proposed Item 45(e)(2)(iii), which as noted, does not seem to have been
incorporated in Regulation S-K. See Amendments to Guides 5 and 16, supra note
5, at 18 (amending Guide 5 to include relevant language); Guides Release, supra
note 3, at 1105 ("If no market exists for the subject securities, the manner in which
the value of outstanding securities has been estimated should be set forth, together
with appropriate caveat, e.g., that such assigned value may bear no relationship to
the assets, earnings or other criteria of value applicable to the registrant.").
13 Registration Statements, Securities Act Release No. 5279, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,010,
16,010 (July 26, 1972).
14 id.
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Then in 1981, without explanation, the SEC moved away from this
earlier approach focused on pricing/valuation methods to one focused on
pricing factors. The apparent assumption of this move was that investors
were adequately protected from mispricing by the operation of
presumptively efficient securities markets, which in the 1980s were
becoming increasingly institutionalized, and the negotiations between
issuers and managing underwriters in public offerings, which served to
ensure a fair market valuation of the offered securities. 15
2. Pricing Disclosure in Registered lPOs
Despite the admonitions in the earlier SEC guidelines that issuers avoid
boilerplate disclosure to IPO investors, this has become the dominant
practice. Consider typical disclosure from the prospectus for the IPO of
Netflix in 2002:
Before this offering, there has been no public market for
our common stock. The initial public offering price was
determined through negotiations among us and the
representatives. In addition to prevailing market conditions,
the factors considered in determining the initial public
offering price are:
* the valuation multiples of publicly traded
companies that the representatives believe to be
comparable to us;
* our financial information;
* the history of, and the prospects for, its past and
present operations, and the prospects for, and
timing of, our future revenues;
* an assessment of our management, its past and
present operations, and the prospects for, and
timing of, our future revenues;
* the present state of our development; and
* the above factors in relation to market values and
various valuation measures of other companies
engaged in activities similar to ours.
16
15 For example, the SEC assumed that unsophisticated investors were protected by
efficient markets, making additional pricing disclosure superfluous. See Securities
Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Act Release No.
7314, Exchange Act Release No. 37,480, 62 SEC Docket 1046, 1049-52 (July 25,
1996) [hereinafter Securities Act Concepts]. And, in considering the need for
pricing disclosure in penny-stock offerings, the SEC took the view that Item 505
provided adequate disclosure in a typical public offering. See Proposed Revision of
Regulation S-K, supra note 3, at 320.
16 Netflix, Inc., Prospectus (Rule 424(b)(4)), at 78 (May 22, 2002).
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This state of the art has passed muster with the SEC and its staff. In
fact, the SEC has not given further guidance or interpretation of Item 505. 
3. Pricing Disclosure in Low-Intermediation Registered IPOs
The SEC, however, has not been oblivious to the importance of
meaningful pricing disclosure when there is a lack of intermediation in
registered public offerings. In its 1980 guidelines on disclosure in registered
offerings, the SEC considered whether issuers of penny stocks (equity
securities at under $5.00/share) should be required to provide a signed letter
"explaining the reasons for such a low stock price. ,1 8 In adopting Reg S-K,
the SEC concluded extra disclosure was not necessary for penny-stock
offerings because "Item 505 will provide investors with adequate disclosure
and ... such additional requirements would be duplicative ..... 19 But in
1989, the SEC returned to the question and concluded that the market for
penny stock is frequently dominated by broker-dealers--"thereby
permitting arbitrary pricing., 20 Ultimately, the agency adopted rules
requiring broker-dealers to provide investors in penny stock detailed
information on the risks of investing in such stock, current market
quotations and monthly statements showing the changes in market price of
such stock held in a customer's account.2
Further, in discussing new rules on blank-check companies (issuers of
securities without a specific business plan for the proceeds), the SEC stated:
Ordinarily, the price at which securities are to be offered
takes into account a number of factors, including book
value, asset value, projected earnings, the price-earnings
ratio of other companies in the same industry, and current
market price. In an initial public offering, certain of these
typical factors . are not available. Where an offering is
made by a blank check company, objective pricing factors
are scarce and pricing is largely arbitrarily detfrmined.22
17 See Regulation S-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm (last updated July 8, 2011).
18 See Guides Release, supra note 3, at 1064-65.
19 Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K, supra note 3, at 320.
20 Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, Exchange Act
Release No. 27,160, 44 SEC Docket 600, 603 n.14 (Aug. 22, 1989).
21 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15g-1 to -100 (2011); Amendments to the Penny Stock Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,983, 70 Fed. Reg. 40,614, 40,614-33 (July 13,
2005).
22 Penny Stock Definition for Purposes of Blank Check Rule, Securities Act
Release No. 7006, Exchange Act Release No. 32,575, 54 SEC Docket 1020, 1022
(July 2, 1993).
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Based on this assessment, the SEC cautioned blank-check companies to
"provide complete issuer disclosure to investors. 23
B. Pricing Disclosure in Unregistered Offerings
Unregistered offerings are permitted if exempt from registration. Some
exemptions-such as section 4(2) of the Securities Act (section 4(2)) for
private placements-come free of specific disclosure requirements. Other
exemptions-such as under Regulation A (Reg A) and Regulation D (Reg
D)-impose a variety of conditions, including specific disclosure
requirements.
Most unregistered offerings that occur under Reg D happen as Rule 506
offerings, given that the exemption imposes no dollar limits and preempts
state blue sky registration requirements. 4 In addition, issuers generally
open their Reg D offerings only to accredited investors, thus avoiding
compliance with Reg D's specific disclosure requirements.25 Thus, most
Reg D offerings do not-and need not-comply with the pricing disclosure
rules that otherwise would apply to a registered offering or to one made
under Rule 505 or 506 that included non-accredited investors.
Issuers using Rule 505 or 506 in offerings that include non-accredited
investors-representing only about 9.7% of the total of such offerings-
must provide the non-accredited investors with a disclosure document
whose contents are specified in Reg D.26 The requirements for pricing
disclosure under Reg D vary. For offerings over $7.5 million, the disclosure
requirements are the same as those that apply to registered offerings-thus
leaving investors, as we have seen, with only a list of pricing factors,
without meaningful disclosure of the pricing/valuation methods used. For
smaller offerings, the disclosure requirements track the regime laid out in
Reg A for exempt public offerings.
23 Id.
24 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAW. 919,
922 (2011). This was based on review of approximately 27,000 Form Ds filed
between September 15, 2008 and October 18, 2010, finding that 94.0% of offerings
were made under Rule 506, with only 1.6% under Rule 505. See id. at 926. Even
though more than half of the Reg D offerings in the sample were for less than $5
million-thus qualifying for Rule 505-issuers overwhelmingly chose Rule 506.
See id.
25 See id. at 929-30 (based on review of sample of 1000 Form D filings from
September 15, 2010 to October 12, 2010, finding that 394 of 438 (90.0%) of
offerings under $5 million were made exclusively to accredited investors).
26 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(D) (2012); see also Campbell, supra note 23, at 929
tbl.VI (based on review of 1000 Form D filings in 2010, finding that 91 of 941
(9.7%) of Rule 505 and 506 offerings included non-accredited investors).
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Reg A, though itself rarely used,2 7 provides some helpful guidance from
the SEC on the level of pricing disclosure appropriate for public investors
in the absence of intermediation. The SEC disclosure rules for these mini-
registrations require that issuers provide information about how the
offering's price compares to company earnings, revenues and assets.28 It is
the only time when the information that investors (of all stripes) hunger to
know is actually required by SEC disclosure rule.
1. Pricing Disclosure in Private Placements
Offerings under section 4(2)-as well as its safe harbor Rule 506-do
not require that investors receive specific disclosure, including of pricing.
Thus, the only guidance to issuers on pricing disclosure comes by virtue of
Rule lOb-5 and its liability scheme that creates a duty for the issuer to
undertake complete and honest disclosure. The assumption is that
sophisticated investors will fend for themselves, including by analyzing a
company's prospects and financials to determine price fairness.
Not surprisingly, issuers undertaking private placements treat pricing
disclosure as an afterthought. In a sampling of some recent private
placements of different types of securities, the offering memos provide
pricing disclosure that is desultory at best:
Example #1: The Company is offering __ Units of
Common Stock and Warrants, each Unit consisting of
share of Common Stock and Warrants . . . The
purchase price for each Unit is $49,000.
Example #2: The exercise price for each Share is $1.25.
This price was determined by Management of the
Company, in its sole judgment.
Example #3: Series A Preferred Stock - 5,000,000 shares.
Price per share - $0.50 ... Risk Factor: The price of the
Shares was determined arbitrarily and is not based on any
empirical valuation. As a result, the price of the Shares may
not represent the fair market value of such Shares.29
27 In a comprehensive study of the use of Regulation A, Professor Campbell found
that the SEC received on average only eight filings under Regulation A annually
from 1995-2004. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses'
Search for "A Moderate Capital," 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 83 (2006).2 8 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FORM I-A: OFFERING STATEMENT UNDER
REGULATION A 10 (2012) [hereinafter FORM I-A].
29 Confidential private placement memos on file with author.
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Nowhere do the memos identify the pricing model used in the offering
(such as earnings multiples, adjusted book value, discounted cash flow) or
the assumptions underlying the model used. Instead, private investors are
forced to come to their own conclusions. Caveat emptor is the stated basis
on which the privately placed securities are offered.
2. Pricing Disclosure in Exempt Public Offerings
Some registration exemptions permit offerings to public investors,
provided they receive a specified disclosure document and other
protections. For example, Rule 505 (unlike Rule 506, which requires
investor sophistication) permits offerings to non-accredited investors who
lack sophistication-provided they receive a disclosure document. °
Likewise, Reg A exempts offerings to public investors (now up to $50
million following the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act))
from full-blown registration if the issuer complies with disclosure and other
requirements-a de facto mini-registration. In both situations, the offering
can be made to unsophisticated investors, without the protective presence of
intermediates or other sophisticated investors.
Reg D-exempt public offerings. Non-accredited investors in a Rule
505 offering must receive a disclosure document, ostensibly with pricing
disclosure. If the issuer qualifies for Reg A, disclosure must comply with
Form 1-A.31 If not eligible for Reg A, issuers must provide investors a
disclosure document that conforms to Form S-1, the registration statement
filed in a registered offering.
32
Curiously, for Rule 505 issuers that do not qualify for Reg A
disclosure, the pricing disclosure required in their offering largely tracks
that required in a registered public offering-that is, there is virtually no
recognition of the need for pricing guidance to unsophisticated, non-
accredited investors when the offering lacks meaningful intermediation. For
Rule 505 offerings, financial disclosure varies depending on the offering
amount. For offerings up to $2 million, the issuer must provide the
information required in Article 8 of Regulation S-X.33 Pricing disclosure in
30 Regulation D, Item 502(b)(2)(i) requires issuers of offerings under Rule 505 or
Rule 506 not subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) to disclose
specific information about their business and the securities offered to all non-
accredited purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a), (b)(2)(i).
3 Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A).
32 Id.
13 Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(1); see also Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory
Relief and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 8876, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,994, 92 SEC Docket 436, 440 (Dec. 19, 2007) (explaining that Article 8 of
Regulation S-X contains scaled disclosure requirements and generally limits the
number of years of information provided based on the size of the company).
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offerings between $2 million and $7.5 million is that required under Form
S-i-namely, the listing of pricing factors required by Item 505 of Reg S-
K, without any need to describe the pricing methodology. 34 The same
reference to Form S-I is also true for offerings above $7.5 million
(necessarily under Rule 506, given that Rule 505 has a $5 million cap).35
Although the SEC has interpreted the Reg D disclosure regime to
require that investors be furnished information "to the extent material to the
understanding of the issuer, its business, and the securities being offered,"
the SEC's interpretive guidance is noticeably silent on the question of
pricing disclosure.36 In a concept release, the SEC has raised the question
whether sophisticated investors need as much disclosure as unsophisticated
investors where there is no efficient capital market for the pricing of the
offered securities.37 But the agency has never answered the question with
respect to pricing disclosure in exempt public offerings under Reg D.
In practice, pricing disclosure under the Reg D disclosure rules is the
exception. Most Reg D offerings are made exclusively to accredited
investors, exempting the offering from the Reg D disclosure requirements.
38
In addition, most smaller Reg D offerings under $5 million are made
without intermediation by a securities firm acting as broker or
underwriter. 39 Thus, investors in a Reg D offering, though mostly
accredited, must fend for themselves in deciding whether the price of the
offered securities is a fair one.
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(2)(i)(B)(2) (requiring financial disclosure based on Form S-
1 for smaller reporting companies); see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL
WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 29:2.1 (2d ed. 2008)
(identifying that pricing disclosure in a Regulation D offering is under Item 505 of
Regulation S-K).
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(3).
36 See Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 27
SEC Docket 347, 355 (Mar. 3, 1983) (interpreting disclosure requirements of Rule
502(b) of Regulation D). In addition, Rule 502(b)(2) requires all Regulation D
issuers to provide "additional information to non-accredited investors [and] the
opportunity for further investor inquiries .... Id. at 357.
37 Securities Act Concepts, supra note 15, at 1050-51 (soliciting comments on
whether "the broad dissemination of publicly available information regarding a
company, which the 'efficient market theory assume[s],' is in fact a reality for most
investors"). Further, the SEC questioned whether it mattered under the efficient
market theory "if just sophisticated investors have this information?" Id. at 1051.
38 See Campbell, supra note 24, at 929 tbl.VI (based on sample of 1000 Reg D
filings from September to October 2010, finding that 885 (88.5%) were made
exclusively to accredited investors).
" See id. at 931 tbl.IX (based on sample of 1000 Reg D filings during September
and October 2010, finding that 49 of 552 (8.9%) of offerings below $5 million
involved a securities firm).
386 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Reg A-exempt mini-registration. Reg A is designed to allow smaller
issuers to raise capital without going through a full-blown registration, but
instead in a less-exacting and less-costly mini-registration. The SEC regime
for Reg A offerings assumes they will typically be made to unsophisticated
public investors without protections that come from a market or the
presence of sophisticated investors in the offerings. The pricing disclosure
required under Reg A is generally the most complete and useful under the
federal securities laws-though it still does not call for pricing analysis
based on discounted cash flow, the most widely used method for securities
valuation.
Reg A issuers must provide investors an Offering Circular, contained in
Part II of Form 1-A. 40 Recognizing the special needs of Reg A investors,
the SEC specifies that information in the Offering Circular must be
"presented in a clear, concise and understandable manner. 41 Specifically,
the SEC requires all corporate issuers to provide narrative disclosure based
on Model A of the Offering Circular.42
The Offering Price Factors section of Model A (Items 5-8) gives Reg A
issuers guidance on making disclosures "relevant to the price at which the
securities are being offered"-including after-tax earnings, price-earnings
multiples and net tangible asset value.43 The SEC states that the information
is intended to allow potential investors to "consider whether or not the
offering price.., for the securit[y] is appropriate at the present stage of the
Company's development."44
Specifically, Item 5 asks for disclosure of the net, after-tax earnings for
the last fiscal year, with losses shown in parenthesis. 45 Item 6 asks for the
40 17 C.F.R. § 239.90; see also FORM 1-A, supra note 28. All information in the
offering circular is subject to the general requirements of Rule 252 on form and
Rules 253 and 255 on content. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252 (explaining that an offering
statement consists of a facing sheet and contents must not be misleading); id.
§ 230.253 (explaining that an Offering Circular shall include narrative and financial
information required by Form 1-A); id. § 230.255.
41 17 C.F.R. § 230.253.
42 Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, Exchange Act
Release No. 30,968, 51 SEC Docket 2154, 2201 (July 30, 1992).
43 Id. at 2223. The financial information used in these price-relevant items must be
consistent with the financial statements provided in Part F/S. Id. at 2224
(Instruction Note, Items 5-8). Part F/S of Form 1-A requires the issuer to provide
financial statements prepared in accordance with the GAAP. Id. at 2221-22. These
statements include the company's balance sheet prepared within ninety days prior
to filing the offering statement, statements of income, cash flows and stockholder
equity for the two preceding fiscal years, specific financial statements of businesses
to be acquired and pro forma financial information. Id. at 2223-24.
44 Id. at 2224.
41 Id. at 2223.
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disclosure of the offering price as a multiple of earnings, if the issuer had
profits, adjusted to reflect for any stock splits or recapitalizations.46 Item
7(a) asks for disclosure of the net tangible book value of the issuer, defined
as the "total assets (exclusive of copyrights, patents, goodwill, research and
development costs and similar intangible items) minus total liabilities. ' 47
Item 7(a) also requires disclosure of reasons for any pricing variation if the
net tangible book value per share is substantially less than the offering price
per share.48 Item 7(b) requires disclosure about securities the issuer sold
during the last twelve months, including the amount, number of purchasers,
the relationship of those purchasers to the issuer, the price at which the
securities were sold and the type of consideration received, if not cash.4 9
Item 8(a) requires disclosure of the "percentage of... the Company...
the investors in this offering have" assuming exercise of outstanding
options, warrants or rights and conversion of convertible securities. 50 Item
8(b) requires disclosure of the "post-offering value" that management
attributes to the issuer based on "the price per security set forth on the cover
,,51page ....
The Reg A pricing disclosures-not part of the disclosure requirements
for registered offerings-were added by the SEC in 1980, clarifying the
requirements of the Act's Schedule I so that investors could "consider
whether or not the offering price ... for the securities is appropriate at the
present stage . ,." The ostensible purpose was to provide investors "a
more complete document at the time of filing with the Commission," to
ease the burden on issuers to identify material information needed by
unsophisticated public investors in the absence of protective
intermediation.53 While SEC staff has offered interpretive guidance on
46 Id.
47 id.
48 Small Business Initiatives, supra note 42, at 2223.
49 Id.
50 id.
5' Id at 2224.
52 Id.; see also The Small Offering Exemption from Registration Requirements,
Securities Act Release No. 6275, 21 SEC Docket 1024, 1028 (Dec. 23, 1980);
Notice of Proposed Revision and Consolidation of Regulation A and Regulation D,
Securities Act Release No. 3613, 21 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Feb. 18, 1956) (showing
Schedule I simply listed information needed in the Offering Circular, but did not
give explanations to issuers or require disclosure of information to allow an
investors to determine specifically whether the security is correctly priced).
53 The Small Offering Exemption from Regulation Requirements, supra note 52, at
1028.
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aspects of Form 1-A, it has not interpreted the offering price factors that are
to be disclosed in the Offering Circular.
5 4
In practice, however, Reg A has not become the mini-registration
workhorse for exempt public offerings that some expected.55 Despite some
fanfare in the early 1990s that Reg A might be used to facilitate Internet
offerings to public investors, it never panned out. In its 1998 review of the
regulation applicable to securities offerings, the SEC commented that
though the disclosure requirements in a Reg A offering were less extensive
than those applicable to small issuers under Regulation S-B, only a small
number of reporting small issuers actually use Form 1-A.5 6 Professor
Campbell arrived at the same conclusion in his extensive study of the use of
the SEC's offering exemptions.57 Small issuers that might qualify to use
Reg A frequently choose Rule 506 under Reg D, given the latter's
preemption of state blue sky registration requirements.58 The lesson: for
small public offerings to be feasible, they must receive significant
regulatory dispensations, particularly from mandatory ex ante disclosure
and auditing requirements.
II. PRICING DISCLOSURE IN CROWDFUNDING
The JOBS Act of 2012 opens a new chapter in the regulation of
securities offerings. It introduces the possibility for small issuers to use the
Internet to access capital ("funding") from public investors (the "crowd")--
at far lower cost than in a registered offering and with fewer regulatory
burdens than in an exempt unregistered offering. As a practical matter,
"crowdfunding"-in its current form-will be effectively capped at
54 Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/safinterp.htm (last updated Sept. 17,
2010) (Question 228.01). The lack of interpretation may be because the SEC has
stated "the textual disclosure requirements of Part I-Offering Circular are
essentially self-explanatory." The Small Offering Exemption from Registration
Requirements, supra note 52, at 1028.
55 In a comprehensive study of the use of Regulation A, Professor Campbell found
that the SEC received on average only eight filings under Regulation A annually
from 1995-2004. See Campbell, supra note 27, at 83.
56 The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606,
Exchange Act Release No. 40,632, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,519,
68 SEC Docket 835, 865 (Nov. 3, 1998) (explaining that small business issuers
who provide non-financial statement disclosure based on Form 1-A, instead of
Regulation S-B are called "transitional small business issuers").
57 Campbell, supra note 27, at 83 (finding only eight filings per year under
Regulation A during the period from 1995-2004).
58 See Campbell, supra note 24, at 934-38.
2012 Pricing Disclosure: 389
Crowdfunding's Curious Conundrum
$500,000, with individual investors limited in the amount they can invest
based on their annual income. 59
Despite its promise, crowdfunding under the JOBS Act could fizzle or
bomb. There is a chance that crowdfunding intermediaries-a mandated
element under the new law-will not want to undertake the liability risks
imposed on them.60 There is also a chance that crowdfunding will become a
tool for Internet frauds and scams, at first harming investors and eventually
scaring them away.6 '
59 Investors whose annual income or net worth is below $100,000 may invest the
greater of $2000 or 5% of their annual income or net worth in a twelve-month
period. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat 315 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)). Investors with an
annual income or net worth exceeding $100,000 may invest 10% of their annual
income or net worth up to a $10,000 maximum per twelve months. Id. The Act's
language is ambiguous as to how the maximum amount allowed for investment will
be calculated. See Steven C. Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption.:
Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2066088. The statute is unclear whether the limits are
calculated based on the greater or lesser of annual income or net worth. For
example, if annual income is $150,000 but net worth is $75,000, will the maximum
be 5% of net worth or 10% of annual income?
60 A person acting as an intermediary in a crowdfunding will likely fall within the
definition of an "underwriter," even if the person is not a traditional securities
professional. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social
Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1735, 1760 & n.148
(2012) ("The term 'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation
in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking .... (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(1 1))); see also Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REv. 1433, 1439 (2012)
(explaining that no one may choose to become an intermediary because of the
mandated requirements and liability attached to the undertaking).
61 For example, the SEC has already received an advertisement soliciting
crowdfunding investors for a company whose promoter estimates a market value
"in excess of $1 trillion" (twice the size of Apple, Inc.) that will bring a return on
investment of "100 times [investment] in 1-to-3 years and 1,000 times by holding
for 3-to-10 years." See Jonathon Weil, Crowdfunding and the Greatest Investment
Opportunity EVER!, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 23, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-23/crowdfunding-and-the-greatest-investment-
opportunity-ever-.html. Criticism of the House Bill's crowdfunding provisions,
which provided for neither disclosure nor accountability, was withering. See Emily
Chasan, SEC Advisory Group Stews over Crowdfunding, CFO J. (Feb. 2, 2012,
4:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/02/02/sec-advisory-group-stews-over-
crowdfunding-dangers/ (explaining that the SEC's Advisory Committee on Small
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Thus, critical to crowdfunding's future is whether the liability scheme
introduced in the JOBS Act will be able to navigate between over- and
under-vigilance. The liability scheme, loosely drawn from the one
applicable to participants in a registered public offering, would seem to
impose due diligence and materiality standards that could well be the
drivers for disclosure in a crowdfunded offering.
If so, how pricing information is disclosed to crowdfunding investors-
by definition, public investors lacking in sophistication62 and without the
intermediation created by the presence of underwriters or institutional
investors-will be a critical aspect of crowdfunding's success or failure.63
SEC disclosure rules for non-intermediated public offerings, particularly
under Reg A, offer some ideas on what pricing disclosure might look like in
this new financing space. In addition, securities fraud litigation that has
grappled with the contextual nature of "materiality" and the relevance of
investor non-sophistication in exempt offerings offers guidance in
formulating a workable crowdfunding liability regime.
In the end, it seems inescapable that pricing disclosure-of the
valuation model used by the issuer and the assumptions built into the
and Emerging Companies worried it would be "too easy for businesses to commit
fraud in crowdfunding scenarios"); Steven M. Davidoff, From Congress, a Law
Befitting a Sausage Factory, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 3, 2012, 4:18 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/from-congress-a-law-befitting-a-sausage-
factory/?ref=todayspaper ("There is real risk that Congress's actions could harm
the market. People pay more for American stocks than they would for those in
other countries because we have enhanced antifraud rules. If investors lose faith in
the United States market, stocks may decline in value.").
62 A recent study by the SEC, mandated by section 917 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
confirms this assumption. The study found that retail investors in the United States
do not understand basic and critical financial concepts, such as compound interest,
inflation, diversification or even the difference between stocks and bonds. See U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG
INVESTORS iii-iv (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY). The
study further found that the lack of this critical knowledge reduced the ability of
investors to protect themselves from investment fraud and recommends methods to
increase financial literacy among retail investors. See id. at iii-vii.
63 See Hazen, supra note 60, at 1754 (explaining that meaningful disclosure must
be part of any proposal attempting to strike a balance between investor protection
and the desire to encourage small business financing). But see Bradford, supra note
59, at 25 (explaining that major flaws of the crowdfunding exemption include
complicated and excessive disclosure requirements as well as the expectation that
entrepreneurs have advanced understanding of corporate finance to properly
disclose relevant information). For example, as Professor Bradford points out, new
section 4A(b)(1)(H)(iv) requires companies using crowdfunding to explain to
investors about "how the securities being offered are being valued," requiring
entrepreneurs to have sufficient knowledge of corporate finance to describe
valuations. Id.
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model-is material to investors in an offering, where the investors lack
sophistication and valuation/pricing intermediaries are absent. Thus, failure
to provide such disclosure would constitute a material omission on which a
cause of action could be based to seek recovery of losses after a failed
(essentially, mispriced) offering.
A. Crowdfunding Mechanism
The JOBS Act was signed into law in April 2012 with a lofty goal: to
increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access
to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.64 In general,
the JOBS Act seeks to increase access to public markets for a new category
of issuer (the "emerging growth company"), reduce restrictions for all
issuers using Reg D and Rule 144A, expand the use of Reg A and create
new financing opportunities for small businesses through the crowdfunding
mechanism. 65 The most controversial of these initiatives in the strongly
bipartisan legislation, and the only one that underwent significant
amendment after it passed the House, was Title III, "Crowdfunding.
66
The hope of the JOBS Act's crowdfunding mechanism is to give small
businesses (and potentially some larger businesses) greater access to capital
by making online securities offerings to a large number of investors-at
61greatly reduced costs by avoiding many of SEC registration requirements.
Crowdfinding originated in the United States not as an "investment"
model, but rather through a "donational" one in which individuals gave
money to fund various projects without expecting to receive profit or an
64 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act pmbl., Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
65 Bruce Bennett et al., The JOBS Act: New Rules for Emerging Growth
Companies, Private Placements and "Crowdfunding, " (Covington & Burling,
LLP), Apr. 2, 2012, at 1. In addition, the JOBS Act requires intermediaries in a
crowdfunding to provide investors with investor-education materials and
disclosures regarding risks of investing in the offering. Id. at 8.
66 DAVID A. CIFRINO ET AL., THE IPO AND PUBLIC COMPANY PRIMER: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC, RAISING CAPITAL AND LIFE AS A PUBLIC
COMPANY 28 (2012).
67 Joan Macleod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 880-81
(2010) ("As we use the term in this article, crowdfunding involves using a web-
based business enterprise to seek and obtain incremental venture funds from the
public using a website ... to connect business or projects in need of funding...
with potential funders."); see also Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping
the Right Crowd 2 (Apr. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1578175 (explaining that crowdfunding found its root in
crowdsourcing, "which uses the crowd to obtain ideas, feedback and solutions in
order to develop corporate activities. In the case of crowdfunding, the objective is
to collect money for investment ... " (citation omitted)).
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ownership interest in the business in return.68 Instead, "funders" often
received returns on their donations in the form of samples of the completed
product, tickets to the planned performances, credit in the film and so forth.
Under this model, crowdfunded "issuers" were not offering securities and
thus were not required to comply with SEC regulations.6 9
As the popularity of crowdfunding grew, the pressure grew on
regulators to allow for-profit crowdfunding and to create an exemption
from SEC registration to encourage capital investment by "funders" seeking
to earn a financial profit on their investment.70 While commentators
differed on the specific proposal that should be adopted, most agreed that a
crowdfunding exemption would promote economic growth. 71 Because
crowdfunding offerings adopting an investment model most certainly
constituted the sale of securities under federal securities laws,7 2 the SEC
was forced to take action as companies tested the boundaries of the new
model.73 The push for an exemption from SEC registration requirements for
crowdfunding reached a crescendo in late 2011 as commentators,
68 CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 28.
69 Bradford, supra note 59, at 3 (explaining that fundraising and charitable
donations are not regulated under securities laws).70 See Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors and Job Creation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov 't Reform, 112th Cong. 5-6 (2011) (statement of
Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission) ("Interest in crowdfunding as a capital raising strategy...
is growing .... The staff has been discussing crowdfunding... with business
owners, representatives of small business industry organizations and State
regulators."); Cohn, supra note 60, at 1436 (indicating that online crowdfunding
was occurring in large amounts, prompting the legislature to address the "continued
benign sweeping under the enforcement radar screen").
71 Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
See., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
1 (2011) (statement of John C. Coates IV, Professor, Harvard Law School)
[hereinafter Hearing] ("[T]he proposals under review all raise the same general
trade-off, which is best understood not as economic growth vs. investor protection,
but as increasing economic growth by reducing the costs of capital-raising vs.
reducing economic-growth by raising the costs of capital raising ... the proposals
are thus all best viewed as proposals for risky but potentially valuable experiments,
and should be treated as such-with an open mind, but also with caution and
care.").
72 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)
(defining an investment contract as an investment in a common enterprise with an
expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of the promoter).
73 See, e.g., Migliozzi, Securities Act Release No. 9216, 2011 WL 2246317 (June
8, 2011) (cease and desist order issued to block fundraiser for Pabst Blue Ribbon
Beer, in which each donor given certificate of ownership in company and beer
equal to the amount of contribution).
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regulators, legislators and even the White House urged for an exemption,
which culminated in legislative action.74
1. Crowdfunding's Legislative History
The House crowdfunding provisions sought to give small issuers access
to "Main Street" money through the Internet with little regulatory
interference, thus to stimulate job creation. The Senate, however,
concluded the House Bill lacked vital investor protections.7 6 The Senate
74 See Hazen, supra note 60, at 1750-51 (explaining several different proposals
recommended by legal commentators, congressional leaders and the White House
to create a crowdfunding registration exemption). The crowdfunding language of
the original JOBS Act, H.R. 3606, drew heavily on the bare-bones crowdfunding
provisions in H.R. 2930, the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, which passed the
House in November 2011, but lay dormant in the Senate as Senators considered
two of their own crowdfunding bills. Id. at 1750 & n.83 (explaining that the House
passed a bare-bones crowdfunding bill on November 9, 2011, while the original
Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Nondisclosure Act of
2011, S. 1790, introduced by Senator Jeff Merkley on December 8, 2011, and the
Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, introduced by Senator Scott
Brown on November 2, 2011, were being debated); H.R. REP. No. 112-355,.at 104
(2012). The principal difference between the passed House bill and the proposed
Senate bills was that the House bill was not conditioned on meaningful disclosure,
while the Senate bills required broader disclosure and accountability. See Hazen,
supra note 60, at 1753-54 (explaining the proposed disclosure requirements in
Senate bills 1790 and 1791). But see Cohn, supra note 60, at 1437-38 (criticizing
Senate amendments for adding significant requirements, thus preventing small
issuers from using the exemption).
75 Since it was based on language of the already passed H.R. 2930, the original
crowdfunding provision in the JOBS Act received glancing attention in the House,
where the initial form of the bill was passed after only one day of consideration.
158 CONG. REc. H1288-89 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (indicating H.R. 3606 was
passed 390-23 on March 8, with consideration beginning on March 7); see also id
at H 1277-78 (2012) (statement of Rep. Frank) (explaining that, while supporting
the bipartisan measure, allotting twenty to thirty minutes for the entire JOBS Act is
not sufficient to properly weigh the controversial issues and potential amendments
to the bill).
76 See 158 CONG. REC. S 1674, S1675 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Merkley) (explaining that pushing for ratification of the House Bill would lead to
"predatory investing schemes" similar to those seen in the movie "The Boiler
Room"); 158 CONG. REC. S1714, 1724-25 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (letter of Nick
Bhargava, Partner, Motaavi, LLC) (Durham-based crowdfunding intermediary
expressing concern of the language of Title III of the JOBS Act because it does not
provide adequate investor protection and puts the entire crowdfunding industry at
risk of significant fraud); id. at 1722-23 (letter of Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission) (explaining that while crowdfunding may be
used to help raise capital at early stages of development in a business, failure to
provide adequate investor safeguards would cause "investor confidence in
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amended the Bill to require greater disclosure and to impose liability on
issuers (as well as funding intermediaries) for misinformation in a
crowdfunding offering. 77  Despite some resistance to the Senate
amendments, the House concurred, paving the way for the Bill to be signed
into law.78
In both the House and Senate, crowdfunding was seen as a way to
increase capital access for small businesses, leading to job growth based on
data that job growth occurs after a company goes public.79 In the Senate,
crowdfunding was argued to be a tool to "unleash billions of dollars... of
local investment [and] allow people with great innovative ideas to for the
first time raise capital from our middle class."'s
In the Senate, concerns about the House crowdfunding provisions in the
JOBS Act centered on the lack of investor protection. 81 As Senator Levin
stated, "The House bill would expose retail-investors-those with no
expertise and no resources-to assess the risks of participating in the
crowdfunding [to] be significantly undermined and would not achieve its goal of
helping small businesses").
77 CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 28.
78 See 158 CONG. REc. H1586 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Bachus)
(striking Title III of H.R. 3606 and adopting Senate amendments to the Title). The
SEC has been charged with drafting regulations to enact the crowdfunding
provisions and is currently soliciting recommendations on how to enact the
provisions.
79 See 158 CONG. REc. H1222, 1226 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Sessions) (explaining that startup firms less than five years old created almost forty
million jobs in a thirty-year period and 90% of this job creation occurred after the
company went public). But see John Haltiwanger et al., Who Creates Jobs? Small
vs. Large vs. Young 3 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Paper No. CES-
WP-10-17, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1666157 (explaining that,
once firm age is controlled for, there is no relationship between size of the business
and growth).
80 See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S 1886-87 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Merkley) (explaining that the Internet provides new opportunities for capital to
reach small businesses and gives folks equal opportunity to invest in early-stage
businesses that may be the new Starbucks, for example); see also 157 CONG. REC.
S8458-59 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Merkley) (explaining that
crowdfunding, so long as it is done with proper oversight, is "American
entrepreneurism at its best").
g See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, Investor
Protection Is Needed for True Capital Formation: Views on the JOBS Act (Mar.
16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch0316121aa.htm
(explaining that H.R. 3606 would hurt investors by reducing transparency and
investor protection and is based on the faulty premise that securities regulations
reduce capital raising, when evidence shows regulations enhance capital
formation).
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unregulated market-to massive potential fraud and abuse. 8 2 Specifically,
the House Bill was criticized for allowing companies to raise up to $1
million from the public without providing any financial information to
investors and without a registered intermediary. 3 Further, the House Bill
placed no limits on how much any one investor could invest in a
crowdfunding, lacked any advance public notice requirement to give the
SEC an opportunity to investigate before securities were sold and allowed
anonymous stock promoters to engage in "pump and dump" schemes.8 4
These concerns led to the introduction in the Senate of the Capital
Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act
of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act). 5 The Senate Bill added significant investor
protections not included in the House Bill:
" required financial statements whose depth and
level of review would vary depending on the size
of the offering;
8 6
* specified company information "relevant or
germane to the conduct of the company;
8 7
* liability for failure of the company to stand behind
the accuracy of this information;
88
82 158 CONG. REC. S1726 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (statement of Sen. Levin).
83 158 CONG. REc. S1675 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley)
("That is not an investment market; that is a scam.").
84 Id. (explaining "pump and dump" means promoters push the security with
wonderful comments, but fail to identify themselves as having a connection with
the company offering the stock).
85 158 CONG. REc. S1806 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012); id. at S1794 (Senate Bill 1884,
introduced by Senators Merkley, Bennett and Brown). The proposed
CROWDFUND Act was meant to provide "significant regulatory relief to very
small issuers without unreasonably compromising the investor protection
provisions on which the federal securities laws are grounded and the long-term
success of the U.S. securities markets has been based." 158 CONG. REC. S1878
(daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (letter of Mercer Bullard, President and Founder, Fund
Democracy). The CROWDFUND Act was said to offer a solid foundation for
crowdfunding, compared to the original crowdfunding provision of H.R. 3606,
which was characterized as "a path to predatory schemes." Id. at S 1887-88
(comments of Sen. Merkley).
86 158 CONG. REc. S 1887 (comments of Sen. Merkley) (explaining that if the
offering is for less than $100,000, the CEO of the company may certify the
financial statements; if the offering is between $100,000 and $500,000, a CPA
must review the financial statements; and if the offering exceeds $500,000,
financial statements must be audited).
87 Id.
88 Id. (explaining that for a capital market to work well there must be disclosure of
information and one has to stand behind the accuracy of their information); see also
infra Part II.B.
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* a required intermediary "portal" so investors would
"know they are getting straightforward
information, not something that is spun;
89
* a cap on how much individual investors could
invest in a crowdfunding based on their income; 9°
* a three-week waiting period beginning with the
company's listing of an offering until its closing;9'
* disclosure by paid promoters of their connection to
the company;9' and
* a mandate that the SEC ensure early investors are
not "diluted in a fashion in which they are basically
written out of their share of the ownership. 93
In addition, the CROWDFUND Act introduced a requirement that
intermediaries provide investor education materials "determined
appropriate by the SEC" to ensure investors understand the risks associated
with investing in a startup.94 The investor education requirement recognizes
that the risks of investing in a startup cannot be mitigated through normal
means, such as diversification. 95 The requirement is meant to discourage
"fraudulent operators" by ensuring crowdfunding investors are educated
enough to process the issuer's sales efforts. 96
The Senate's CROWDFUND Act passed the Senate without significant
revision97 and was sent to the House, where it received immediate
89 158 CONG. REC. S 1887 (explaining that the registration process to become a
portal is less onerous than to become a broker dealer).
90 Id. (explaining that if a person makes less than $40,000, their investment cap is
$2000; if their income is between $40,000 and $100,000, their investment cap is
5% of their annual income; and if their income is over $100,000, their investment
cap is 10% of their annual income).
91 Id
92 Id. (explaining that this is intended to prevent "classic boiler room" where "pump
and dumps" cause everyone who invested to lose out).
93 Id.
14 See id. S1886; 158 CONG. REC. S1749 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (text of
amendment SA 1884 proposed to Bill H.R. 3606).
95 158 CONG. REC. S5474, S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Merkley) (explaining that crowdfunding investors may not fully understand the
level of risk involved in this type of investment even with the mandated investor
education).
96 158 CONG. REC. S2229-30 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Brown)
(explaining that because proper investor education and "crowdvetting" of
opportunities by impartial third parties discourage fraudulent operators, issuers
should not be allowed to encourage investment outside of the intermediary).
97 158 CONG. REc. S1884.
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attention.98 Some in the House expressed the view that the Senate
amendments undermined the non-regulatory intent of the original House
Bill.99 But others argued that the protections of the Senate Bill were for "the
classic widows and orphans out there that are not necessarily financially
sophisticated."' 0 0 In the end, the House discussion centered on the Bill's
bipartisan nature, the support by the White House and the aim to promote
job growth for small businesses. 01 The House concurred 380-to-41 with the
Senate crowdfunding amendments, leaving for another day further tinkering
with the legislation.'0 2
2. Crowdfunding Under the JOBS Act
Under the JOBS Act, "crowdfunding" is available to non-reporting,
non-investment companies organized in the United States seeking to raise
annually up to $1 million in securities offerings, primarily over the
Internet.' °3 Under new section 4(6) of the Securities Act, crowdfunding
offerings need not be registered with the SEC-and state registration,
98 See 158 CONG. REC. H 1588 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Bachus)
("I ... urge the House to approve this bill today ...."); 158 CONG. REC. S2083
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (indicating that the message was delivered to the Senate
at 5:25 P.M. on March 27 and that H.R. 3606 was signed by the Speaker of the
House).
99 See 158 CONG. REc. H 1590 (statement of Rep. Schweikert) ("The Senate has
amended [the crowding portion of the bill] in such a way that I believe it does great
damage to the goal of a much more egalitarian, technologically advanced, using-
the-Intemet way for people to invest ...."); id. at H 1592 (statement of Rep.
McHenry) ("Rather than recognizing that crowdfunding could create new markets
and opportunities for small businesses and start-ups, these misguided Senators
simply saw crowdfunding as unregulated activities.").
'00 Id. at H 1590 (statement of Rep. Himes).
'0' See id. at H 1592 ("I very much appreciate the intent of this legislation. We had
good support from both sides of the aisle. The President is supportive."); id.
(statement of Rep. Bachus) ("[This debate] shouldn't distract from the fact that this
is a major piece of legislation that will cause, I think, a great deal of new
competition, innovation of new products and services."); id. (statement of Rep.
Biggert) ("Many of these changes in this bill have bipartisan backing and have
been endorsed by the President's Council on Jobs and Economic
Competitiveness"); see also President Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint
Session of Congress (Sept. 8, 2011) (indicating that President Obama supported the
crowdfunding exemption); Hazen, supra note 60, at 1751. But see Cohn, supra note
60, at 1434 ("Congress's rush to action resulted in a statute that appears to have
failed in its primary purpose .... ).
102 158 CONG. REC. H1598 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012). But see id. at H1590
(statement of Rep. Schweikert) ("We still should be voting for this bill.... We're
making progress. But there are things we have to do to fix this for the future.").
103 CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 27.
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documentation and offering requirements are preempted.' °4 Individual
investors are limited in the aggregate annual amount of securities they may
purchase in crowdfunding offerings based on their annual income and net
worth.' °5
In addition, there are a bevy of further conditions and requirements for
companies seeking to raise capital through a crowdfunding offering:
* The crowdfunding offering must be conducted only
through either a registered broker or a "funding
portal" registered with the SEC.
106
* Investors must be provided certain disclosures
about the company and the offering, such as a
description of the company's officers, directors and
shareholders; the company's business and business
plan; limited financial information, which varies
from only disclosure of the company's tax returns
to audited financial information, based on the size
of the offering; how the offering's proceeds will be
used; the offering price and method by which the
price was determined; and the company's capital
structure. 1
07
* A company engaging in a crowdfunding may not
advertise the offering, except by referring investors
to the broker or funding portal. The brokers and
funding portals may be compensated, as allowed
by SEC rules.
0 8
* Securities sold through a crowdfunding cannot be
resold for one year, unless to the issuer, an
accredited investor, a family member or as part of a
registered offering. 109
104 Bradford, supra note 59 (manuscript at 16) (explaining that securities sold
pursuant to section 4(6) crowdfunding exemption are "covered securities" under
section 18(4) of the Securities Act).
105 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat 306
(2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing that investors
whose annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 are capped at the greater of
$2,000 or 5% of annual income or net worth while investors whose annual income
or net worth is higher than $100,000 are capped at 10% of their annual income or
net worth, not to exceed $100,000). But see id. § 401 (questioning the ability of a
portal to ensure that investors do not exceed the aggregate maximum).
106 Id. § 302. A broker or funding portal that facilitates crowdfunding offerings
must also register with applicable self-regulatory organizations. Id.
107 id.
108 id.
109 Id.
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The JOBS Act directs the SEC to adopt implementing rules within 270
days of its enactment, and the agency solicited pre-rule comments on April
11, 2012.0
The crowdfunding mechanism, as outlined in the JOBS Act, has led
some commentators and practitioners to doubt whether it can succeed as a
low-cost investment mechanism to fund small businesses.11" ' Some have
argued that issuers that used the donational crowdfunding model to raise
small, amounts of money may find the new investment model cost-
prohibitive. 1 2 For example, given the requirement of audited financials for
crowdfunding offerings over $500,000, issuers planning offerings of this
size may turn to other exemptions to raise capital. 13 The crowdfunding
investment model must also confront the challenge of large numbers of
unsophisticated investors, who will likely be unknown to the issuer."
l 4
Whether intermediaries emerge to identify and promote viable
crowdfunding opportunities also remains an open question, particularly
given the uncertainty of the disclosure requirements and liability risks. The
SEC's implementing rules-as has happened with other exemptions
authorized by Congress-may determine the fate of crowdfunding as a
viable financing tool.
3. Investor Education in Crowdfundings
In the JOBS Act, Congress (for the first time) required investor
education as condition of an investment. Under section 4A(a),
'10 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Seeks Public Comment Prior to
JOBS Act Rulemaking (Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/
2012/2012-60.htm.
111 See CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 28 (concluding that crowdfunding costs as
percentage of proceeds may be too high to make mechanism useful); Anna Denton,
How the JOBS Act Impacts Offerings, DLA PIPER (June 27, 2012),
http://www.dlapiper.com/how-the-jobs-act-impacts-offerings/ ("If the regulations
and ensuing controls do not result in prohibitive cost and burdensome disclosure,
this exemption could result in an efficient system of raising small amounts of
money to fund entrepreneurs); Cohn, supra note 60, at 1434 (asserting that "heavy-
handed" additional requirements of Senate amendments likely will prevent many
small issuers from using crowdfunding).
112 See Cohn, supra note 60, at 1444 (explaining that there may be a use for
offerings around $250,000, but smaller offerings will likely not be able to use the
model).
"3 Id. at 1444-45 (explaining that issuers who would normally make use of the
crowdfunding model may have to resort to other avenues, such as Rule 504 or the
Intrastate exemption, to raise money because of the costs in a crowdfunding
offering).
114 CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 28 (explaining that the costs and
responsibilities of having a large number of unsophisticated investors will consume
time of the issuer and potentially impair long-term strategies of the company).
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crowdfunding intermediaries must provide potential investors "investor
education materials and disclosures regarding risk," as specified by the
SEC." '5 In addition to providing investors these education materials,
intermediaries must ensure each investor (1) reviews the materials," 6 (2)
affirms he or she understands the risk of losing the entire investment," 17 and
(3) answers questions demonstrating an understanding of the level of risk
generally applicable to investments in small issuers, the risk of illiquidity
and such other matters as the Commission determines appropriate." 8
To date, the SEC has not specified what disclosures or education
materials that intermediaries will be required to provide investors.
Nonetheless, a recent SEC study on financial literacy among investors gives
some clues.' 19 The study found four key content areas to promote financial
literacy: (1) different types of risk; (2) the fees and costs associated with
investing; (3) proactive steps for avoiding fraud; and (4) general investment
knowledge, including topics such as compound interest.120 The study also
set a goal to promote a website (Investor.gov) "as the 'first stop' for
investing information," suggesting that investor education materials may
centralized to ensure uniformity.1
2
'
While the SEC's rules on investor education are not due until January
2013, there seems to be a consensus that requiring investor education will
be useful in a crowdfunding offering. 122 In fact, for small business
115 Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(3)-(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1 (2006), amended by
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat 306
(2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §77d-1).
116 Id. § 4A(a)(4)(A).
"l Id. § 4A(a)(4)(B).
118 Id. § 4A(a)(4)(C).
"9 See FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY, supra note 62, at 179-82 (explaining
strategies the SEC identified to improve financial literacy of investors).
120 Id. at 180.
121 Id. at 182. By requiring that investors visit a centralized site to take an investor
education test, the SEC may be better able to ensure that investors actually
understand the education materials given them. See Letter from Occupy the SEC to
Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 4-5, (July 31, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-i/genera/general- 193.pdf.
122 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 67, at 936 (quoting Dale A. Oesterle,
The High Cost of lPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United States, 1
ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 369, 379 (2006)) (explaining that better investor education
and stronger enforcement makes any increase in attempted fraud in crowdfunding
bearable); Letter from Occupy the SEC, supra note 121, at 4 (arguing that the
investor education provision ensures that investors have sufficient knowledge and
understanding of financial markets to make prudent investments); Anton Root,
Crowdfunding Investor Education. A Discussion with EarlyShares Chairman
Stephen Temes, CROWDSOURCING (June 21, 2012, 2:08 AM), http://www.crowd
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entrepreneurs who turn to crowdfunding, education in the basics of
corporate finance may be useful in pricing their companies' securities
offerings. Education in the crowdfunding space will undoubtedly be a two-
way street, with entrepreneurs often having as much to learn as investors.
Some crowdfunding websites (perhaps preparing for their roles as portals)
have already begun offering investor education about crowdfunding, with
education for crowdffunding entrepreneurs no doubt soon to follow.123
B. Crowdfunding Liability: New Section 4A(c)
In addition to conditions and requirements an issuer must meet to be
eligible for a crowdfunding offering, the JOBS Act also introduced new
liability for deception in a crowdfunding in new section 4A(c) of the
Securities Act (section 4A(c)). 12 4
1. Legislative History of Crowdfunding Liability Provisions
The crowdfunding liability provisions added by the Senate, permit
investors in a crowdfunding to bring an action at law or in equity if an
issuer makes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact required to be stated or necessary to make the statements not
misleading, based on a standard of reasonable care. From appearances,
crowdfunding liability is in addition to liability that might otherwise arise
under state and federal antifraud laws. The crowdfunding liability scheme
was seen as an important basic protection for investors, particularly given
the absence in the House Bill of either disclosure requirements or liability
provisions. 125
sourcing.org/editorial/crowdfunding-investor-education-a-discussion-with-
earlyshares-chairman-stephen-temes/16014 (explaining that there is a huge need for
portals to make an educational push because a lot of individual investors have
never been able to invest in start-up companies directly and they need to learn what
it really means).
123 See Peoples VC Offers 1st Investor Ed Class for Crowdfunding Investors, PR
NEWSWIRE (June 13, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/peoples-
vc-offers- 1 st-investor-ed-class-for-crowdfunding-investors- 158885945.html
(announcing Peoples VC as the first Crowdfunding site to offer online "education
and certification" classes for crowdfunding investors).
124 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat 306
(2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)).
125 The original version of H.R. 3606 left state enforcement authority in place for
"securities or securities transactions, with respect to[:] (1) fraud or deceit; (2)
unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer; and (3)... unlawful conduct by an
intermediary, issuer, or custodian." H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011); see 158
CONG. REC. H1591 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Bachus) ("It is
also important to know that all the antifraud protection, we didn't take any of that
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The liability provision of the Senate Bill received scant attention. The
Bill's sponsor, Senator Merkley, in discussing the difference between the
House and Senate versions, pointed out that the House version not only
failed to require that issuers provide disclosure to investors, but included no
accountability for false or misleading information in a crowdfunding.
126
Senator Merkley explained that the Senate Bill corrected this deficiency-
in a way that balanced low-cost capital formation and investor protection-
by requiring issuers to disclose only "information [that is] relevant or
germane to the conduct of the company" and by imposing "basic liability"
on issuers subject to due diligence protection.1 27 The only other reference to
the added liability provisions came in Senate deliberations eight days after
the Senate passed its crowdfunding bill when another of the Bill's sponsors,
Senator Brown, stated:
[I]ssuers should not be held liable for misstatements or
omissions that were made by mistake. The standard of
liability for issuers as described in Section 4A(c) should be
"due diligence . . . ." [meaning] issuers must do their "due
diligence" to make sure the information that they are
providing to potential investors is accurate. This is a widely
accepted liability standard.
128
After passing the Senate, the liability provisions of section 4A(c)
received no specific attention in the House during its hurried deliberations
on the Senate amendments. 29 Although some House members complained
that the Senate Bill diminished the intended goal of the House Bill to allow
small businesses greater access to capital, there was no mention of the
away."). In debating H.R. 3606, amendments to add liability provisions were
offered to the bill to "improv[e] the underlying bill in the area of investor
protection." 158 CONG. REC. H1256 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Waters) (discussing her amendment to H.R. 3606 which aimed to hold securities
firms acting as underwriters to stricter liability in a crowdfunding). Amendments
seeking to add liability provisions into H.R. 3606, however, were harshly criticized,
and none made it into the bill the House presented to the Senate. H.R. Con. Res.
3606, 112th Cong. (2012); see also 158 CONG. REC. H1257 (statement of Rep.
Garrett) ("This information can and should get out there; but at the end of the day,
we want to make sure that the liability ... imposed on the dissemination of
information is not so grave and dangerous.., to destroy that overall purpose of the
legislation."); id. at H 1256 (statement of Rep. Hensarling) ("to add yet another
level of liability, one that.., for all intents and purposes ... would simply gut this
bill").
126 158 CONG. REC. S1884, S1887 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012).
1271Id. at S1887.
128 158 CONG. REC. S2230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Brown).
129 See generally 158 CONG. REC. H1586 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012).
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Senate's added liability provisions.'3 This may have been because of the
brevity of the House debate or the view (expressed by the Senate sponsors)
that the liability provision balanced access to capital and investor
protection. As one of the House Bill's sponsors, Representative Bachus,
explained: "[W]hat gave us more concern than anything else . . . about the
Internet [was] people making an investment subject to fraud. That is a
concern, and the Senate addressed those concerns .... [W]e will continue
to look at crowdfunding."'
' 31
2. Elements of Liability Under New Section 4A(c)
Under new section 4A(c), 132 purchasers have a private right of action
against a company that engages in a crowdfunding offering by means of
130 Id. at 1590-91. See generally id. at H 1856 (no reference to the new section
4A(c)).
131 Id. at 1591 (statement of Rep. Bachus).
132 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat
306 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1). As added by the JOBS Act, new
section 4A(c) of the Securities Act specifies:
LIABILITY FOR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS AND
OMISSIONS.
(1) ACTIONS AUTHORIZED
(A) IN GENERAL. Subject to paragraph (2), a person who
purchases a security in a transaction exempted by the provisions
of section 4(6) may bring an action against an issuer described in
paragraph (2), either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if such
person no longer owns the security.
(B) LIABILITY. An action brought under this paragraph shall be
subject to the provisions of section 12(b) and section 13, as if the
liability were created under section 12(a)(2).
(2) APPLICABILITY. An issuer shall be liable in an action
under paragraph (1), if the issuer-
(A) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by any
means of any written or oral communication, in the offering or
sale of a security in a transaction exempted by the provisions of
section 4(6), makes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact required to be stated or necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, provided that the
purchaser did not know of such untruth or omission; and
(B) does not sustain the burden of proof that such issuer did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission.
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material misstatements or omissions (written or oral) in connection with the
offering. 133 Liability in section 4A(c) is "as if the liability were created
under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act., 134 The cause of action under
section 4A(c) is subject to the statute of limitations of section 13 of the
Securities Act, the same one that applies to actions under section
12(a)(2). '
Section 12(a)(2) liability. To understand the section 4A(c) liability
scheme created by Congress, it is useful to understand the contours of
section 12(a)(2) liability. By its terms, section 12(a)(2) imposes liability on
any person who "offers or sells" any security (except government
securities) "by means of a prospectus or oral communication" that is
materially false or misleading.1 36 Plaintiffs may rescind the transaction and
get their money back with interest or recover rescissionary damages if they
have resold their securities. The Supreme Court has interpreted this
language to reach only public offerings, thus excluding liability under
section 12(a)(2) for exempt private placement or market trading.' 37
(3) DEFINITION. As used in this subsection, the term 'issuer'
includes any person who is a director or partner of the issuer, and
the principal executive officer or officers, principal financial
officer, and controller or principal accounting officer of the issuer
(and any person occupying a similar status or performing a
similar function) that offers or sells a security in a transaction
exempted by the provisions of section 4(6), and any person who
offers or sells the security in such offering.
Id.
133 Bennett et al., supra note 65, at 8.
134 id.
135 Bradford, supra note 59 (manuscript at 19-20). Section 13 of the Securities Act
provides that an action must be brought "within one year after the discovery of the
untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by
the exercise of reasonable diligence .... [I]n no event ... more than three years
after the sale." Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006).
136 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2); see also CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 87-
88.
137 By its terms, section 12(a)(2) applies to sales and offers of securities (except
government securities) "by means of a prospectus or oral communication."
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language
to reach only public offerings, thus excluding liability for exempt private placement
or market trading. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995) (holding that
contract of sale between sophisticated parties could not constitute a "prospectus"
under section 12(a)(2) because it was not the prospectus filed in a registered public
offering). The Court's reading of section 12(a)(2) to cover only "public" offerings
is laden with ambiguity. It is unclear whether small public offerings (such as those
under Regulation A or Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D) are covered by section
12(a)(2). The Court's understanding that "prospectus" in section 12(a)(2) refers to a
section 10 prospectus that "must include the information contained in the
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Section 12(a)(2) liability extends not only to those who pass title, but
also to those who solicit securities sales to further their own or the issuer's
financial interest. 38 Thus, except for those who give gratuitous advice,
section 12(a)(2) covers any persons involved in the selling effort.'39
Plaintiffs need not prove the defendant's culpability, but instead section
12(a)(2) gives defendants a "reasonable care" defense if they show they did
not know (and "in the exercise of reasonable care" could not have known)
of the misinformation.1 40 Some courts have understood this "due care"
defense to create a duty of due diligence similar to that applicable to
registered public offerings.
141
Under section 12(a)(2) the plaintiff need not show that he relied on the
alleged misinformation. Rather, recovery is conditioned only on "the
purchaser not knowing" of the challenged misinformation. Nonetheless,
courts have made reliance an issue by insisting on proof of a causal
connection between the misinformation and the transaction. 142 Although the
purchaser need not have received the misinformation-such as false
disclosure documents distributed by the issuer-the misinformation must
registration statement" suggests the section might cover "prospectus-like" offering
circulars in such exempt offerings. Id. at 569.
138 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 648 (1988).
139 In effect, section 4A(c) adopts the same liability contours. Collateral participants
in a crowdfunding, such as accountants and lawyers, would appear not to be liable
even though they may be a "proximate cause" or "substantial factor" in the
offering. See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 651 (rejecting such tests for liability under section
12(a)(1), which shares the same operative language as section 12(a)(2)).
140 C1FRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 87-88.
14 See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981). The court rejected "reasonable care" as a
defense by a securities firm that acted as underwriter for a commercial paper
offering exemption from the Securities Act registration for failing to investigate
issuer's financial soundness, even though financials had been audited by outside
accountant). Id.; see also David McMahon & Jeevan Subbiah, The JOBS Act &
Crowdfunding-Is It for You?, JD SUPRA (July 23, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/the-jobs-act-crowdfunding-is-it-for-39186/. The Nuveen "due diligence"
standard has been criticized. For example, in his dissent from the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in the case, Justice Powell argued that that the lower court's
reading of section 12(a)(2) imposed an even greater investigation duty than that
applicable to underwriters under section 11 with respect to audited financials.
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 450 U.S. 1005, 1005-06 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
142 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006) ("by means
of' false or misleading prospectus or oral communication).
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have been "instrumental" in the sale, such as when the misinformation
bolsters a market in the purchased securities.
143
Loss causation-a causal link between the misinformation and the
plaintiff's loss-has become an affirmative defense in section 12(a)(2)
actions.144 A defendant in a section 12(a)(2) action may defend by proving
that a portion (or all) of the amount recoverable "represents other than the
depreciation in value ... resulting from" the false or misleading statement
on which liability is based. 145
Elements of section 4A(c) liability. Section 4A(c) imposes liability on
"issuers" in an exempt crowdfunding offering that make any materially
false or misleading statement "by means of any written or oral
communication. 146 By its terms, the action may be brought only by
purchasers who actually purchased the security from the issuer in the initial
crowdfunding offering and not subsequent purchasers. 147 As under section
12(a)(2), plaintiffs in a section 4A(c) action have a right to restitution and
may recover the consideration paid for the security, minus any income they
may have received. 148 Purchasers who no longer own the security are
entitled to recover damages, presumably on a restitutionary basis.
149
Only "issuers" are liable in a section 4A(c) action. For purposes of the
section, an "issuer" is defined to include:
[A] director or partner of the issuer, and the principal
executive officer or officers, principal financial officer, and
controller or principal accounting officer of the issuer (and
any person occupying a similar status or performing a
similar function) that offers or sells a security in a
transaction exempted by the provisions of section 4(6), and
any person who offers or sells the security in such
offering. 50
143 See John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d at 1227 (finding sufficient link, even though
some plaintiffs were unaware of defendant's "risk-free" representations, because
had the market known the truth it would have collapsed).
144 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(b), amended by Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (2006) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa).
145 id.
146 Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(c), amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
147 i.
14 81 d. § 4A(c)(1)(A).
149 id.
150 Id. In relevant part, an "issuer" is defined as:
[A]ny person who is a director or partner of the issuer, and the
principal executive officer or officers, principal financial officer,
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The specification of section 4A(c) defendants, like many aspects of the
new crowdfunding provisions, includes a host of tantalizing ambiguities.
For example, it is unclear whether all officers fall on the enumerated list of
non-issuer defendants or only "principal executive officers." Also unclear,
as noted by Professor Bradford, 5' is whether the parenthetical "(and any
person occupying a similar status or performing a similar function)" is
intended to apply only to the controller or principal accounting officer or to
all listed defendants. 52 Thus, it is unclear whether the term "partner" is
limited to equity participants in a partnership or includes managing
members of a functionally equivalent LLC. Further, it is unclear whether
the phrase "that offers or sells a security in a transaction exempted by the
provisions of section 4(6)" modifies the word "issuer" or the enumerated
defendants. 5 3 If it modifies "issuer," as seems more logical, then the
officers, directors and partners are not required to offer or sell the securities
to be liable, they must only be connected to an issuer in a crowdfunding
offering. 5 4 But if it modifies the full list of potential defendants, an inquiry
into their selling effort would be necessary for liability under section
4A(c). 155
Finally, there is no indication whether listed defendants are liable for
their own misstatements or omissions that are actionable under section
4A(c), or whether they are liable for all such statements in connection with
the offering. 156 If the listed defendants are only liable for their own material
misstatements or omissions, then section 4A(c) will likely have a very
limited effect, given the Supreme Court's recent restrictive interpretation of
what it means to "make" a statement. 157 The interpretation that would give
the liability more efficacy would be one that makes the listed defendants
and controller or principal accounting officer of the issuer (and
any person occupying a similar status or performing a similar
function) that offers or sells a security in a transaction exempted
by the provisions of section 4(6), and any person who offers or
sells the security in such offering.
Id.
151 Bradford, supra note 59 (manuscript at 18-19).
112 Id. at 19.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Id.
156 id.
157 Bradford, supra note 59 (manuscript at 19) (citing Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v.
First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)).
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liable for any actionable misstatements or omissions of the collective
"issuer.,'
158
As with section 12(a)(2), the new section 4A(c) does not make
culpability, reliance or causation elements of the cause of action, but
instead defenses. Defendants have a "due care" defense, which is worded
identically to that under section 12(a)(2). 5 9 In addition, plaintiffs who had
knowledge of the untruth or omission-presumably based on proof by the
defendants-are expressly barred from recovering under section 4A(c). 160
Also, defendants have a negative causation defense if they can prove the
plaintiff's losses did not result from the alleged misstatement or
omission.
16 1
3. Materiality of Pricing Disclosure Under Section 4A (c)
Central to liability and the disclosures implicitly required under section
4A(c)-like that of the other antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws-is the meaning of "material facts" under the new liability scheme:
what information must issuers (and others participating in the
crowdfunding) provide to investors? 162  The classic definition of
materiality-information a reasonable investor would consider important in
his investment decision 163-eads to the further question of who are
158 Id. (explaining that the collective "issuer" includes all listed defendants, and
such an interpretation would explain how directors, partners and officers who did
not themselves offer or sell the securities would be liable under section 4A(c)).
159 Plaintiffs need not prove the defendant acted with scienter, but "defendants may
avoid liability by proving that they 'did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission."' Id. at 18 (citing the
Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(c)(2)(b), amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306 (2012)) (pointing out that "due care"
defense of section 4A(c) is worded identically to that under section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act).160 id.
161 CIFRINO ET AL., supra note 66, at 86-88; Bradford, supra note 59 (manuscript at
18) (pointing out that JOBS Act incorporates negative causation defense of section
12(b) of the Securities Act, which places proof of absence of loss causation on
defendant).
162 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1). Materiality functions as a
"gatekeeper" to ensure companies disclose the right amount of information by
separating essential information to an informed investment choice from less
important information. See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of
"Materiality" Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 661,
662 (2004).
163 A fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... Put
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"reasonable investors" in a crowdfunding. Specifically, must disclosure
provided in a crowdfunding recognize the unsophisticated (and non-
intermediated) nature of investors for whom the crowdfunding mechanism
is aimed?
Materiality, as interpreted by both the courts and the SEC, is
contextual. Information already available to sophisticated investors in
public trading markets is not material, while the same information
unavailable to unsophisticated investors in private markets may well be
material. Pricing disclosure fits this bill. While investors in public trading
markets have few reasons to be informed about the pricing models used to
price the securities offered them, unsophisticated investors in private
markets have significant needs to know about the pricing models used for
the securities offered them. Crowdfunding to unsophisticated investors, in
the absence of intermediation, is a case in point.
One tantalizing requirement of the crowdfunding provisions-possibly
suggesting that the legislation specifically identified the materiality of
pricing information-is the requirement that issuers disclose to investors
"the price to the public of the securities or the method for determining the
price." 164 On a superficial read, the provision could be understood to require
disclosure of pricing methods (such as earnings multiples, comparables and
discounted cash flow) and the assumptions used in fixing the price of the
offered securities. But the phrase, written in the disjunctive, is better
understood to require either disclosure of the fixed price at which securities
are offered or the formula by which the price can be determined. This same
formulation is used in other disclosure rules-such as under Item 505 of
Regulation S-X and Reg A-and has not been understood to impose on
issuers the task of full-blown pricing disclosure, including of the
valuation/pricing methodology used by the issuer in the offering.
Materiality of pricing disclosure. Is pricing disclosure in
crowdfunding material information? That is, would a reasonable investor
consider important the information about the pricing model used by the
issuer to determine the offering price and the assumptions incorporated into
that model? An answer comes from two sources. First, the courts have
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix"
of information made available.
TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Under this standard,
courts must determine whether a proposal (in the case, a voting decision) would
have been favored without the alleged misstatement, but the Court acknowledged
"such matters are not subject to determination with certainty." Id. at 448.
164 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
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made clear that materiality is contextual165 and that pricing information can
be material when investors rely on the issuer to give guidance. 66 For
example, the Supreme Court has accepted that forward-looking statements
by an issuer's board of directors about the price of securities in a merger are
material to shareholders. According to the Court, such opinions-which are
based on information available to the board and derived from the expertise
of the directors-are highly relevant to shareholders, who understandably
rely on the board. Moreover, such statements are actionable if knowingly
false and unsupported. 167 That is, where shareholders rely on an issuer to
provide guidance on the fairness of price in a securities transaction,
disclosure about price is material. False or misleading price disclosures are
actionable if the issuer knows the price is not fair and substantive support
for the price is lacking.
Second, the SEC rules on pricing disclosure reflect the agency's view
that price-related information is material to investors and that the disclosure
varies according to the context. 68 In a registered public offering, the SEC
has accepted bare-bones disclosure of pricing factors, given that the
165 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 ("The determination [of materiality] requires
delicate assessments of the inference a [reasonable investor] would draw from a
given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him."); see also Alan
R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 1, 132 (1999) (explaining that materiality varies according to context, with
courts requiring price effects in market cases while only requiring subjective
relevance in face-to-face transactions).
166 Pricing disclosure is a sub-category of disclosure. See Dale A. Oesterle, The
Overused and Under-Defined Notion of "Material" in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 167, 190 (2011) (explaining that the evolution of sub-doctrines is based on
the context, such as puffery, bespeaks caution, truth on the market and zero price
change); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1084-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that promised returns of 100-200% annually and a
promise that the investment was no-lose were material, even though reasonable
investor would likely know this was not possible).
167 Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093 (1992) (concluding that the
statement by the board that merger price constituted "high" value was material to
shareholders asked to vote on the merger); Helwig v. Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 555
(6th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308 (2007) (explaining that while forecasts can only be material if they can be
calculated with substantial certainty, the information may be material if the figures
are false or misleading). But see Oesterle, supra note 166, at 180-81 (criticizing the
Virginia Bankshares standard for departing from the common law, which refuses to
recognize the materiality of opinions because opinions are understood to be
puffery, too indefinite or vague and too easy to contest).
168 Courts have sometimes followed the SEC's lead on when information is
material, refusing to find materiality if SEC'rules do not require the information.
See Lee, supra note 162, at 670 (explaining that some courts have refused to find
information material when the SEC does not require it).
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offering price is determined in negotiations with the underwriter based on
market conditions and perceptions about the issuer and its securities.169 But
in exempt public offerings, where investors generally lack sophistication
and intermediation by securities professionals is lacking, the SEC has
required specific pricing disclosures, including of such valuation metrics as
price-earnings ratios and net assets per share. Thus, the SEC recognizes that
price disclosure depends on context: the type of offering, the existence of
intermediaries and the nature of the investors targeted by the offering.
Where investors are unprotected by intermediaries (whether securities
professionals or efficient markets) and are otherwise unable to fend for
themselves, the need for pricing disclosure is heightened.
"Reasonable" crowdfunding investor. The "reasonable investor"
standard-part of the materiality definition-is also contextual and
balances the importance to investors of adequate disclosure and the adverse
consequences of too low a threshold. 70 It is generally viewed as an
objective measure of the capacity of investors to absorb and respond to
disclosure, thus to advance the goals of the securities laws to protect
investors from fraud and promote market integrity."' As such, investors in
a crowdfunding-given their presumptive lack of sophistication and the
absence of intermediation by underwriting firms or informationally efficient
markets-are exposed to fraudulent pricing, a risk to these new private
markets.
To understand the "reasonable investor" in a crowdfunding, the
definitions for "reasonable investors" in public trading markets offer
guidance. In such markets, the reasonable investor is described as a rational
market participant1 72 who relies on the sophisticated, information-absorbing
169 See id.
170 TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 445. But see Lee, supra note 162, at 664 (explaining
that the "reasonable investor" threshold often becomes a "wild card," determined
after the fact by judges and regulators based on policy).
171 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the
Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 328 (2009)
(explaining that securities laws are not intended to protect investors from bad
decisions, they are only intended to promote market integrity); see also William A.
Sahlman, How the NY Times Got the JOBS Act Wrong, XCONOMY (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2012/03/15/how-the-ny-times-got-the-jobs-act-
wrong (explaining that as long as people "don't lie, cheat or steal," they should be
able to form enterprises and people who invest in these enterprises may lose
money).
172 A popular model for defining the "reasonable investor" is homo economicus, a
rational (and perhaps imaginary) market participant whose main goal is to
maximize wealth and utility. See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social
Change: The Case for Replacing "the Reasonable Investor" with "the Least
Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 490-91
(2006); see also Denis J. Brion, Norms and Values in Law and Economics, in 1
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capacity of the markets in which the investor trades. 173 Given the variety of
investors in public trading markets, there is no one "reasonable" investing
style-but instead a mix that includes fundamental analysis, technical
analysis and even speculation. 174 The reasonable investor in public trading
markets-an idealized potpourri of rational actors-is the greatest common
denominator capable of weighing all available information that affect the
returns and risks of an investment, and choosing the proper course of
action. 175
Importantly, the "reasonable investor" in public trading markets is
assumed to be part of-and thus, protected by-sophisticated markets that
themselves grasp market pricing fundamentals, such as the time value of
money, the trade-off between risk and return and the value of
diversification. 7 6 These sophisticated markets, and with them the
reasonable investors that participate in them, are assumed to be informed of
all available public information and to be able to discount information that
may be incomplete or inaccurate. 17 In public trading markets, given the
assumption that investors are sophisticated and behave rationally, courts
have accepted defenses against claims of material falsehoods and
omissions-specifically the defenses of mere puffery, 178 truth-on-the-
market 179 and bespeaks caution. 18
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND EcoNoMics 1041-42 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
de Geest eds., 2000) (stating that law and economics "defines the basic agent of
economic action in terms of a homo economicus understanding of human nature-
that the individual is a self-interested actor, competitive in nature, who undertakes
to achieve the rational maximization of personal utility"); Peter H. Huang, Moody
Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and
the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 99, 111 (2005)
(explaining the "reasonable investor" standard as metaphor for the market, similar
to the Capital Asset Pricing Model-that is, something that does not actually exist,
but serves as a useful reference).
173 Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL.
L. REv. 627, 699 (1996) (pointing out that the idea behind disclosure laws is that if
issuers provide sufficient and accurate information, investors will be willing and
able to use information wisely).
174 Heminway, supra note 171, at 298-301 (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Tex.
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)) ("[S]peculators and chartists
of Wall and Bay Streets are... 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal
protection afforded conservative traders.").
' Id. at 300-01.
116 Id. at 301; see also Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)
(explaining that reasonable investors are not "nitwits," do not have "a child-like
simplicity" and are not "babes in the woods").
177 Sachs, supra note 172, at 490-91.
178 Mere puffery is vague and optimistic statements that contain no concrete factual
or material misrepresentation. In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 570
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The assumptions that underlie the "reasonable investor" standard in
sophisticated public markets dissolve when looking at retail investors in
unsophisticated markets. Such investors, according to the recent SEC Study
Regarding Financial Literacy Among Investors, lack basic financial literacy
and do not understand the pricing fundamentals for securities. 8 ' This lack
of knowledge reduces the ability of retail investors to protect themselves
from fraud or to evaluate the risks and price in a securities offering.' 82 The
"'reasonable investor" standard used in sophisticated public markets is
poorly suited to identifying relevant information for retail investors in
unsophisticated markets-in particular, those in which crowdfunding is to
operate.
Given the absence of sophisticated markets for crowdfunding offerings,
the "reasonable investor" in such offerings has a different set of
informational needs than one in a sophisticated market. As others have
noted, the high objective threshold for investors in modem public trading
markets is inappropriate for unsophisticated investors in unsophisticated
(6th Cir. 2004) ("Statements that are 'mere puffing' . . . may be forward-looking or
'generalized statements of optimism that are not capable of objective verification.''
(citing Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 1997))). Mere-
puffery is a defense against materiality because the reasonable investor "knows to
be somewhat wary of a selling agent's oral representations and to check them
against the written materials." Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., 735 F. Supp. 1196, 1202
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
179 Under the truth-on-the-market defense, "reasonable investors" are assumed to be
able to counter-balance any misleading impression, thus rendering false
information immaterial. Huang, supra note 172, at 118-19 (explaining the truth-on-
the-market defense is based on the assumption that securities markets are
informationally efficient). When the context is atomistic voting, rather than trading
in information-absorbing markets, the truth-on-the-market defense is unavailable.
See Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1992) (acknowledging that
deceptive information, though countered by truthful disclosures, can still be
materially deceptive "[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension
between the one and the other").
180 Under the bespeaks-caution defense, the more an issuer qualifies a statement
about the security, the more the "reasonable investor" is able to discount the
information and not be misled. Heminway, supra note 171, at 305 (explaining that
a reasonable investor would not find forward-looking statements with meaningful
cautionary language significant to the total mix of available information). But see
Huang, supra note 172, at 126 (arguing that "'the claim that reasonable investors
cannot be misled by caution-laden estimates and projections is probably wrong
even with respect to the more sophisticated and rational segment of the investor
population"' (citation omitted)).
181 FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY, supra note 62, at 15 (explaining that investors do
not understand elementary financial concepts, such as compound interest, inflation,
diversification or the difference between stocks and bonds).
182 id.
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markets.183 Unsophisticated investors who lack a professional adviser may
well fall prey to misrepresentations that a sophisticated investor would
dismiss as absurd.184 Furthermore, while the "reasonable investor" standard
in a public market is often measured (perhaps appropriately) by the most
sophisticated investor in the market, the goals of investor protection and
market integrity argue for measuring the "reasonable investor" in a private
market by the least sophisticated investor in inefficient markets. 1
85
By requiring intermediaries to provide further disclosures to
crowdfunding investors in the form of investor education materials and
disclosures regarding risks, Congress has recognized for the first time that
the "reasonable investor" standard applicable to investors in sophisticated
markets may not adequately protect investors in unsophisticated markets.
Instead, the investor education requirement signals a different context for
the "reasonable investor" standard. Whether disclosure is material in a
crowdfunding depends on whether the disclosure would significantly alter
the "total mix" of information available to the particular investor. 1
86
The requirement for crowdfunding intermediaries to create and provide
investor education materials does not reduce the disclosure burden on
issuers, but instead signals "reasonable" crowdfunding investors will
require more useful and complete disclosure, particularly on the critical
matter of price. Thus, many statements and omissions that would be
immaterial in an offering to investors in a sophisticated public trading
market become material in a crowdfunding offering. For example,
crowdfunding investors will predictably lack (among other things) an
understanding of securities pricing fundamentals. The omission in a
crowdfunding of information about the pricing model chosen in the offering
and the assumptions used in that model-though not material in a public
offering where investors can rely on the operation of the market to set a fair
price-would significantly alter the total mix of information available to the
typical and reasonable crowdfunding investor.
Not only would disclosure of the valuation/pricing methodology be
required as material information necessary to prevent the offering
documents from being misleading, the disclosure must serve to educate
crowdfunding investors-in tandem with the investor education materials
183 Sachs, supra note 172, at 483-84 (explaining that the "reasonable investor"
threshold is higher than previous standards from the 1930s and 1940s which
protected investors with less-than-average intelligence).
18 4 Id. at 476-77 (pointing out that this type of fraud often increases as technology
allows for more unsophisticated investors to be reached).
185 Professor Sachs has argued that the "reasonable investor" standard should be
replaced by a "least sophisticated investor" standard, drawn from the "least
sophisticated consumer" model in the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, to better
combat fraud in inefficient markets. Id. at 503, 507.186 See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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provided by the crowdfunding intermediaries-in the pricing methodology
and assumptions used by the issuer. Beyond the informational function of
securities disclosure, pricing disclosure would serve an educative
function-similar to the disclosures used increasingly in the direct offering
of mutual funds to public shareholders, another instance of a non-
intermediated public securities market. Moreover, all pricing disclosure in a
crowdfunding-like that in a registered public offering-should be in plain
English, to make it functional for the typical crowdfunding investor.
Burying price disclosure in technical financial lingo would be tantamount to
no disclosure at all.
In sum, the failure of crowdfunding issuers to provide clear, accessible
pricing disclosure-of the valuation/pricing methodology used in the
offering and the assumptions underlying the method chosen-would be
materially false and misleading. In such a situation, investors in the
crowdfunding would be entitled to recover from the issuer and its principal
insiders, as well as any participating securities firm or Internet portal, an
amount that would put them in a position as though they had not invested in
the first place.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF CROWDFUNDING LIABILITY
Even if courts successfully were to navigate these new liability waters,
the nature of crowdfunding-particularly its dollar caps-makes litigation
an unlikely method for fine-tuning pricing disclosure through the new
crowdfunding liability regime. Given the relatively small amounts involved
in a crowdfunding offering, it is unlikely that high-cost litigation
(particularly class action litigation) will provide a workable solution to
molding effective pricing disclosure.
Instead, alternative methods of dispute resolution seem better suited to
the task. It may be possible that an SEC-regulated arbitration regime could
be a low-cost ex post regulation of pricing disclosure. It may also be
possible that a private "pricing insurance" system might be developed by
securities firms and portals, much as private price and quality guarantees
work to give confidence to produce and service consumers on the Internet.
If a non-judicial alternative emerges, however, a set of dynamic
standards-a synthetic common law-will be in order. If arbitration
becomes commonplace, a method must be developed for the system to
generate private law for the use of crowdfunding planners and for the
arbitration system itself. If a private price guarantee takes hold, whether as
an alternative to arbitration or in conjunction with arbitration, it must
generate standards of "good practices" in securities valuation and pricing
disclosure.
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the SEC, in generating
disclosure rules for crowdfunding offerings and setting out standards for
investor education materials, has an important role in laying out the ground
rules for the new disclosure regime-especially the methods and guidelines
for setting and disclosing price in these novel small business offerings. In
fact, given the structural defects (laid out next) inherent in the various
possible ex post liability schemes to generate workable standards for pricing
disclosure in crowdfunding offerings, the SEC's role in creating ex ante
standards becomes all the more critical. And, as important as such standards
will be in giving investors some tools to evaluate the crowdfunding's
promises and dangers, the standards create a blueprint for small business
entrepreneurs (perhaps assisted by intermediaries required by the
crowdfunding mechanism) to evaluate their business, its capital needs and
its prospects.
A. Private Enforcement: Individual (or Class) Litigation
While the JOBS Act provides a private right of action for investors in a
crowdfunding, recovering damages through litigation might prove
difficult.' 87 Because the crowdfunding mechanism contemplates that
businesses will raise necessary capital through small investments by a large
number of investors, it is unlikely that any investors, individually, will have
sufficient damages to warrant bearing the high costs associated with
litigation. 188
As a practical matter, the small amount of money invested by
individual investors in a crowdfunding makes a private suit cost-
prohibitive. 8 9 Each investor's recoverable damages will be at most the
consideration paid. 190 Further, given the crowdfunding investment caps,
individual investors will have at most between $10,000 and $100,000 at
stake, and often no more than $2000.
Further, the total size of the crowdfunding offering will likely be too
small to make class action litigation a feasible alternative for investors--or
187 See Hearing, supra note 71, at 12.
188 Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth
Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an
Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 607, 609 (2010) (arguing
that in absence of class action, individual investors have little incentive to litigate
securities law violations because they would be forced to bear all costs while
receiving only fraction of potential total recovery).189 id.
190 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1).
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class action lawyers.1 91 A crowdfunding class action, given the dollar cap
for such offerings, would result in a damages award of at most $1 million;
and because most crowdfunding offerings are likely to be limited to
$500,000 due to auditing requirements for offerings above this amount, the
damages award would be even smaller. 192 In either event, the amount
available for attorneys' fees would likely not justify the action.
In other securities contexts-such as fraud in trading markets and in
large public offerings-class actions provide a mechanism for investors
(and their class action counsel) to collectively overcome the litigation
impediments faced by individual investors.' 93 Instead of pursuing individual
actions, investors take advantage of legal economies of scale by pooling
costs and benefits to pursue the action and thus strengthen each investor's
opportunity to maximize a settlement.' 94 Moreover, such actions increase
accountability and deterrence for issuers, which face a real threat of
litigation and money judgment as the result of misbehavior. 195
Consider securities fraud class action results in public companies. In
such lawsuits, when the class action is not dismissed, management has
strong incentives to settle the action, sometimes even regardless of the
merits, rather than pursue litigation. 96 On average, settlements of securities
fraud class actions between 1998 and 2000 with estimated damages of less
than $50 million settled for 10.5% of estimated damages. 97 Legal fees in
'9' Hearing, supra note 71, at 12 (explaining that "no self-respecting class action
plaintiffs' attorney could be relied upon to know [or] police start-ups that are too
small to even be called 'microcap"').
192 See id.
193 Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence of Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1465, 1466 (2004).
194 Id. at 1466-67; see also Bondi, supra note 188, at 609 (explaining that class
actions allow individual investors to avoid the risks of going alone in actions by
pooling costs and benefits and share proportionally).
195 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 74 (2008) (explaining that class actions have many
positive effects and evidence shows that private enforcement of regulations greatly
assists with enforcement and deterrence).
196 Choi, supra note 193, at 1466; see also Todd Foster et al., Recent Trends in
Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Filings Stay Low and Average Settlements
Stay High-But Are These Trends Reversing?, How MARKETS WORK (Nat'l Econ.
Research Assocs.), Sept. 2007, at 7 (explaining that between 2005 and 2007,
approximately 39.1% of class actions were dismissed).
197 See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 7 (2011).
The median settlement for actions from 2008 to 2011 alleging only a section
12(a)(2) violation was 7.4% of estimated damages. Id. at 11 (finding that between
2008 and 2011 only 68 of the securities fraud class actions alleged only a section
11 or section 12(a)(2) violation, with 50% of the cases settling for a median of $3.3
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securities fraud class actions, typically charged as contingency fees subject
to court approval, average between 20-30% of the settlement amount.
98
That is, even smaller securities fraud class actions that were settled resulted
in awards of attorney fees of more than $1 million.
B. Public Enforcement
The SEC has broad authority under the federal securities laws to pursue
violators, including issuers who engage in negligent misrepresentations in a
securities offering, whether registered or exempt. 199 Although the SEC
cannot use section 4A(c), which by its terms is limited to purchasers in a
crowdfunding, the same issues of materiality (and reasonable investor)
would be at the heart of an SEC enforcement action. A failure of an issuer
to adequately disclose its pricing model (and assumptions) in a
crowdfunding could be the basis for an SEC enforcement action-with the
advantage that the section 4A(c) culpability, reliance and loss causation
defenses would not apply. Thus, the SEC would have significant latitude to
seek recovery on behalf of bilked investors in a fraudulent crowdfunding,
beyond that which might be available under section 4A(c).
Due to its limited budget, however, the agency must prioritize its
enforcement operations.2 °0  Currently, the SEC prioritizes its cases
million, 7.4% of estimated damages). When the class alleges both a violation of
section 12(a)(2) and a violation of Rule 10b-5, the median settlement was 3.6% of
estimated damages. Id. (finding that over the same period of time, 228 class actions
were filed alleging a Rule 1Ob-5 violation along with a section 11 or section
12(a)(2) violation, with a median settlement of $10.8 million, 3.6% of the estimated
damages).
198 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 889-90
(1987); see RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 197, at 7. Attorney fees in securities
fraud class actions are often charged on a contingency basis which "depends on a
number of factors, such as the size of the recovery, the amount of time expended by
the attorneys involved in the action, and the complexity of the litigation."
Frequently Asked Questions About Class Actions, BERNSTIEN & LIEBHARD, LLP,
http://www.bemlieb.com/FAQs/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
199 See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006); see also James D.
Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737,
746-47 (2003) (explaining that the Securities Enforcement and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 was intended to expand the SEC's ability and flexibility to
attack fraudulent practices by granting the SEC the power to obtain cease and
desist orders and the ability to disgorge ill-gotten gains).
200 Cox et al., supra note 199, at 751-52, 757-59 (explaining that SEC enforcement
staff over the past decade has increased by 16%, while the number of cases
commenced over the time period increased 77%); see also Barbara Black & Jill I.
Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration,
23 CARDozo L. REv. 991, 1020 (2002) (explaining that SEC is particularly focused
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according to a number of factors: (1) the message delivered to the industry
and public; (2) the amount of investors harm done; (3) the deterrent value
of the action; and (4) the SEC's visibility in certain areas, such as insider
trading and financial fraud.20 ' Given this weighing of the social benefits of
its enforcement choices, the SEC's limited focus on private placements is
understandable.0 2 For example, according to the SEC's Office of Inspector
General, the agency does not review the substance of Form D filings, which
it treats instead as notice filings.20 3
The SEC's lack of enforcement in private transactions is
understandable considering the factors the agency applies for bringing an
enforcement action. 20 4 For example, the operative assumption of Reg D
enforcement has been that the SEC is charged with overseeing offerings on
a national scale (Rule 506 offerings), while states are charged with policing
smaller offerings (under Rule 504, Rule 505 and Reg A)-hence the
preemption of state blue sky law for only Rule 506 offerings.20 5 This
division of labor also fits with the SEC enforcement factors, given that Rule
506 offerings have a more pronounced effect than smaller offerings.
But as many smaller offerings have migrated to Rule 506,206 which
offers an exemption from state filing requirements, state regulators are
often left with limited options to attack fraud in small offerings.2 °7 Also, the
SEC's resources are stretched thin. For example, the SEC office in charge
of reviewing the thousands of Form Ds filed each year, the Division of
Corporate Finance's Office of Small Business Policy has a staff of five
on boiler room operations and microcap fraud, excessive markups, market
manipulation and fraud in connection with hot IPOs).
201 Cox et al., supra note 199, at 751 (explaining that SEC enforcement is used as a
beacon showing what the SEC considers important to preserving the integrity of the
financial markets).
202 See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 151, 153 (2010) (explaining that the theory behind limited enforcement
in private placements is that accredited investors, those who most often participate
in these offerings, are able to fend for themselves and need only limited
disclosure).
203 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REGULATION D
EXEMPTION PROCESS 8 (2009).
204 Johnson, supra note 202, at 164.
205id"
206 Campbell, supra note 24, at 919; see also VLAD IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS,
CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS
USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 1 (2012) (stating that the median size of a
Reg D offering is approximately $1 million).
207 Johnson, supra note 202, at 179-81 (explaining that states are still able to fine
issuers for failing to file Form D, but have limited other options).
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attorneys and one secretary.2° The Division only rarely refers Reg D
209
violations to the SEC's Enforcement Division for action.
The enforcement of Reg D rules, instead, has fallen on the shoulders of
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)-the self-regulatory
organization (SRO) that oversees securities firms. In the past several years,
FINRA has taken a more visible role in dealing with violations in Reg D
offerings.21 ° In April 2010, FINRA issued a regulatory notice to all
members regarding Reg D offerings, specifying the amount of due
diligence securities firms must undertake in such offerings to avoid liability
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.21 Among other
requirements, securities firms must more thoroughly investigate "securities
issued by smaller companies of recent origin" and not blindly rely on
information provided by the issuer concerning the company.
2
The SRO enforcement model offers some possibilities, though it might
well be bifurcated. Securities firms (registered with FINRA as broker-
dealers) are subject to FINRA jurisdiction, while portals (registered with an
SRO yet to take clear form) will be subject to a different SRO
jurisdiction.21 3 It is possible to imagine coordination between the two SROs
2 81 Id. at 170.
209 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 203, at 13, 18-20 (2009)
(explaining that, despite discovering multiple violations in a sample of forty-one
Regulation D filings, in the fifteen-month period ending in December 2008, the
Division of Corporate Finance's Office of Small Business Policy only referred one
Regulation D issue to the Enforcement division).
210 See Sara Hansard, FINRA to Get Tough on Reg D Offerings, INVESTMENT NEWS
(Dec. 13, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20091213/REG/
312139913 (explaining that FINRA is conducting a number of investigations of
Regulation D private placements and expects to bring cases against brokerage firms
regarding violations); Bruce Kelly, Finra in Reg D Crackdown, INVESTMENT NEWS
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110407/FREE/
110409930 (explaining that FINRA unleashed sanctions against broker-dealers and
executives of companies who offered Regulation D offerings for a lack of due
diligence); David P. Meyer, Esq., FINRA Continues Reg D Crackdown, MEYER
WILSON (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.investorclaims.com/blog/finra-continues-reg-
d-crackdown.cfm.
211 Regulation D Offerings: Obligation of Broker-Dealers to Conduct Reasonable
Investigations in Regulation D Offerings, 10-22 REGULATORY NOTICE (Fin. Indus.
Regulatory Auth.), Apr. 2010, at 2-3.212 Id. at 3-4.
213 The JOBS Act requires that portals participating in crowdfunding be registered
with an SRO. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-
1 (a)(1)(A) (2006), amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No.
112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). The nascent crowdfunding industry has
already stated support for a new group, the Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory
Advocates (CFIRA). As of April 2012, CFRIA was in the process of determining
rules to "protect investors and support a vibrant industry." Crowdfunding Industry
2012 Pricing Disclosure: 421
Crowdfunding's Curious Conundrum
and even uniform standards with respect to many aspects of crowdfunding
intermediation, including pricing disclosure.214
Coordination, however, could prove difficult. While FINRA requires
broker-dealers to exercise due diligence in recommending a security,
crowdfunding portals are expressly forbidden from making such
recommendations. Nonetheless, the question whether a broker-dealer or
portal chooses to intermediate in a crowdfunding could well carry due
diligence obligations regarding the issuer, its financials and its pricing of
the offering. While not a perfect protection, the SRO model may serve to
create disclosure standards and oversight of an industry that begins its
young life with a murky reputation.215
C. Arbitration
Arbitration offers a possible method for ex post enforcement of the
disclosure standards of section 4A(c). Its lower cost in both legal fees and
time lower the dollar threshold at which claims become viable. The
possibility of special arbitral panels-conceivably with expertise in the
crowdfunding industry, sensitivity to the needs of crowdfunding investors
and working knowledge of the elements of a section 4A(c) action-could
Forms Leadership Group to Pursue Development of Industry Self-Regulatory
Organization, BUSINESSWRE (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://www.businesswire
.com/news/home/2012040500635 1/en/Crowdfunding-Industry-Forms-Leadership-
Group-Pursue-Development.
214 The SEC staff has suggested that FINRA consider adopting its own
crowdfunding rules, even if duplicative of forthcoming SEC rules. Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act: FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed Regulation of
Crowdfunding Activities, 12-34 REGULATORY NOTICE (Fin. Indus. Regulatory
Auth.), July 2010, at 3. FINRA is seeking comments regarding two categories of
rules, one that would apply to funding portals and another to members acting as
brokers. Id. (explaining that FINRA rules would be written specifically for
registered funding portals); see also Barbara Black, FINRA Seeks Comment on
Regulation of Crowdfunding Activities, SECURITIES LAW PROF BLOG (July 7,
2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2012/07/finra-seeks-comment-
on-regulation-of-crowdfunding-activities.html.
215 See Matt Taibbi, Why Obama's JOBS Act Couldn't Suck Worse, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 9, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/
taibblog/why-obamas-jobs-act-couldnt-suck-worse-20120409 (stating that the
"Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act... will very nearly legalize fraud in the
stock market .... this law actually appears to have been specifically written to
encourage fraud"); Chasan, supra note 61 (describing worries of SEC's Advisory
Committee on Small and Emerging Companies that it would be "too easy for
businesses to commit fraud in crowdfunding scenarios"); Davidoff, supra note 61
(arguing that U.S. stocks carry a premium over stocks in other countries because of
enhanced U.S. antifraud rules and "real risk that Congress's actions could harm the
market" if investors lose faith in U.S. stock markets).
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create further efficiencies. And the flexibility of arbitration even opens up
the possibility of "group" arbitration, in which opt-out can be avoided by
pre-dispute agreement.
Courts would likely embrace arbitration of section 4A(c) claims.
Arbitration has become a favored method for dispute resolution of
securities claims, ever since the Supreme Court in the 1980s and 1990s
elevated the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) to a charter of arbitral
freedom.216 While the Supreme Court was initially wary of enforcing pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in securities regulation,2 " the Court reversed
course in 1986 and held that arbitration in securities law claims was not
precluded by the anti-waiver provisions of the securities laws or contrary to
public policy. 2 8 As the Court explained, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum., 219
Arbitration's supporters argue that it offers many advantages over
traditional litigation, particularly class actions suits. Arbitration is
220
considered to be faster and less expensive than litigation. In fact, for
parties in securities disputes who use the FINRA (formerly NASD)
arbitration process as opposed to litigation, arbitral decisions were delivered
on average 40% faster.22 1 Faster arbitration reduces costs compared to
216 Stephen A. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role
in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REv. 175, 179 (2002); see also Steven A.
Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the
Meritorious as well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1096 (1999).
217 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,433-34, 438 (1953) (holding pre-dispute
arbitration agreements to be unenforceable under the Securities Act of 1933).
218 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (holding
that investors could not pursue their rights under the Securities Exchange Act if the
parties had a valid pre-dispute arbitration agreement). The Court extended its
reasoning in McMahon to claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 two years
later. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481,
483 (1989).
219 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-34; see also Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty:
The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 493, 494-
95 (2008) (explaining that the McMahon reasoning is based on two basic
assumptions: 1) that the streamlined arbitration process does not restrict substantive
rights and judicial review is sufficient to ensure protection of these rights, and 2)
SEC oversight of the arbitration process ensures fairness throughout the process).
220 SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. Ass'N, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY 25 (Oct. 2007).
221 Id. at 25-26 (explaining that from March 2005 until March 2006, federal courts
averaged 22.2 months to reach a decision, while NASD arbitration hearings
reached a decision in 13.7 months). Most of the speed improvements came from
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litigation, with a former ABA president estimating that litigation costs run
three-to-four times more than arbitration costs.
222
Further, supporters assert that parties in arbitration are more likely to
have their dispute decided on the merits compared to traditional
litigation.223 In traditional litigation, plaintiffs claiming securities fraud
must meet heightened pleading requirements to withstand a motion to
dismiss.22 4 In contrast, such claimants in arbitration need only file a
statement of claim, "specifying the relevant facts and remedies
requested. ' ' 225 This reduced procedural standard, it is argued, allows
arbitrators leeway in seeking fair results and giving relief in cases that
might be dismissed by a federal court.226 While there is conflicting evidence
over whether parties feel the arbitration process is actually fair,227 the
leeway given to arbitrators to achieve an equitable result arguably has
contributed to half of claimants receiving awards in securities arbitrations
from 1980 to 2001.228
Finally, a key characteristic of securities arbitration is SEC oversight.229
While the actual arbitrations are administered by FINRA (and before by the
NASD), the SEC retains authority to enhance and expand accessibility to
the forum for the benefit of investors. 2' ° Any existing arbitration rules that
procedural practices, such as limited motion practice and narrowly tailored
discovery. Id. at 26-27.
222 William G. Paul, Arbitration vs. Litigation in Energy Cases, Presentation at the
First Annual Energy Litigation Program 3 (Nov. 7-8, 2002).
223 A significant proportion of securities arbitrations are decided by the arbitral
panel following a hearing-20% in 2005, and 18% in 2006. SEC. INDUS. & FIN.
MKTS. ASS'N, supra note 220, at 33. In contrast, from March 31, 2005 to March 31,
2006, only 1.3% of civil cases were heard by a judge or jury. Id.
224 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require plaintiffs alleging fraud to do so
with particularity, alleging specific facts upon which the claim is based. FED. R.
Civ. P. 9. Further, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs alleging fraud under Rule lOb-5 to
meet heightened pleading requirements, such as pleading scienter and specific
instances of each misleading statement in the sale or purchase of a security. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).
225 CODE OF ARBITRATION P. FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES § 12302(a)(1) (Fin. Indus.
Regulatory Auth. 2012).
226 SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, supra note 220, at 32.
227 Black & Gross, supra note 200, at 994 (explaining that individuals associated
with the securities industry extol the efficiency and low cost of the arbitration
system, while investors often object to arbitration on suspicions of the SRO
process).
228 SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, supra note 220, at 34-35.
229 See id. at 47-48 (explaining that oversight by the SEC in one of the main
differentiating qualities of securities arbitration as compared to other, more
controversial types of arbitration).
230 Ramirez, supra note 216, at 1064.
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diluted the effectiveness of crowdfunding arbitration would be subject to
SEC review, and any new rules would require SEC approval.231
But securities arbitration also has its dark side. In fact, Congress, in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank), mandated that the SEC take a look at securities arbitration of
customer-broker disputes. 32 While claimants in a securities arbitration are
not supposed to lose their substantive rights by opting for arbitration, the
arbitrator need not adhere to the rule of law in making a decision.233
Instead, arbitrators have broad power to "do justice as [they] see it,
applying [their] own sense of law and equity to the facts ... and making an
award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement ....,234
Nor is there any requirement that arbitrators, who may or may not be
lawyers, receive adequate training to grasp the complexities of securities
regulation-or the needs of claimants (typically unsophisticated
individuals) in securities arbitration.235
In fact, the industry extols the "standard-less" nature of securities
arbitration, which is said to be guided by principles of fairness and
justice.236 To compound the problem that arbitration need not adhere tolegal standards, arbitrators are not required to provide a written decision
231 SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, supra note 220, at 12. SEC involvement in the
arbitration rulemaking process includes encouragement by the SEC that SROs
adopt the "plain English" requirement in the Code of Arbitration and other investor
materials. Id. This encouragement led NASD to re-format the Code to make it more
"user-friendly," improvements the SEC found to increase transparency and
accessibility of arbitration for pro se claimants. Id.
232 See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act?, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 59,
61 (2010) (describing Dodd-Frank's call on the SEC to look at the fairness of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions).
233 See Black, supra note 200, at 997 (explaining that the McMahon decision was
based on the presumption that arbitrators applied federal statutory law in claims,
but there is no evidence this is actually the case).
234 Silverman v. Cooper, 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308 (1984). But see SECURITIES
ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE 7
(1996) [hereinafter RUDER REPORT].
235 Black, supra note 200, at 1006 (explaining that the Supreme Court obviously
assumed that the law regarding securities was so clear that it can be applied to the
facts of a specific case with some instruction by the proper SRO and, if needed,
will be further clarified by party briefs to the arbitrators).236 The Arbitrator's Manual, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AuTH., Aug. 2012, at 8
("Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is equitable to
prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas
the judge looks only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was
that equity might prevail." (citations omitted)).
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explaining the reasoning behind their award.237 Therefore, even though
parties to an arbitration in theory do not forego their substantive rights, no
mechanism exists for a losing party to know what legal standards the
arbitration panel followed. Absent fraud or corruption, arbitral awards can
be judicially reviewed only if there is a "manifest disregard" for the law,
which the Supreme Court has concluded offers sufficient judicial oversight
to protect the arbitral parties' substantive rights.23 s
In addition, decisions in securities arbitration do not produce
precedential value. 239 This represents a significant drawback for arbitration
as the method of crowdfunding enforcement, given that many standards of
crowdfunding disclosure will likely (or should) arise from the section 4A(c)
duty against making material misstatement or omissions. Further
compounding the problems of an arbitration regime that produces neither
reasoned decisions nor legal precedent is the likely absence of any judicial
decisions on which arbitrators might rely. In short, arbitration could well
undermine the development of standards of full and fair disclosure in
crowdfunding offerings-particularly, standards applicable to the finer
points of setting and disclosing price.
Current arbitration rules also prevent claimants from bringing class
action arbitrations.2 40 But even if the arbitration rules were amended to
allow class action arbitration for crowdfunding offerings, it is unclear that
the cost savings would be enough to make arbitration a viable enforcement
tool.24 1 It seems unlikely that the cost savings of resolving multiple claims
with shared common facts, the likely usual case in a crowdfunding
237 In fact, many in the industry would likely protest a requirement for opinions as
the consensus is that that an arbitration panel's mission is to have a confidential
process for granting awards and a written opinion would hamper this process.
Black, supra note 200, at 1031.
238 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (1 1th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that every Circuit, except the Fifth, has expressly recognized that
"manifest disregard of the law" standard as appropriate for reviewing arbitration
panel's decision). But see Black, supra note 200, at 1014 (explaining that the
limited scope of judicial review creates hurdles for parties seeking to vacate arbitral
award).
239 See Black, supra note 200, at 1001 (pointing out that because most cases are
now heard by an arbitration panel, as opposed to a judge or jury, law in the field
has matured only slightly since McMahon).
240 CODE OF ARBITRATION § 10301(d)(1) (Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers 2002); see also
Bondi, supra note 188, at 624 (explaining that the SEC directed SROs to
considered rules for allowing arbitration of class-action cases but SICA
unanimously adopted a rule to exclude arbitration in class action lawsuits, which
the SEC approved stating that the courts had developed expertise in managing class
actions).
241 See Bondi, supra note 188, at 628.
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24
accomplished by widely disseminated misstatements, 42 would be enough to
justify an arbitration given the relatively small recoveries in a typical
crowdfunding offering.
In short, the relatively small amounts involved in a crowdfunding-and
thus the relatively small amounts of potential recovery-also render
arbitration problematic as a means for effective enforcement and
meaningful compensation in crowdfundings. As with court litigation, the
numbers do not add up. Assuming a typical $300,000 crowdfunding, it is
difficult to imagine a successful "class" arbitration costing less than
$100,000-given attorney fees, arbitration costs and fund administration.
Moreover, the only defendants that would likely be capable of satisfying the
judgment would be crowdfunding intermediaries-that is, the securities
firm or Internet portal required by the crowdfunding regime. Predictably,
they would assert a vigorous defense, whether on the grounds of
materiality, culpability or loss causation, thus adding further to the costs of
the arbitral procedure.
D. Insurance
Crowdfunding thus presents the challenge of any consumer/financial
transaction in which the effects of a failed product/service are relatively
small, compared to the costs of accountability-whether through public
enforcement, private litigation or arbitration. One way of solving the puzzle
is to create an insurance system in which a failed crowdfunding is
insured. 243 The insurance-which would be a cost of the crowdfunding
borne by investors-would avoid the costs of an enforcement system, thus
sidestepping the quagmire of identifying materiality, culpability, reliance
and loss causation. It would also create a natural gatekeeper (the insurance
company) with an incentive to identify potentially fraudulent or mispriced
crowdfunding offerings. In fact, pricing discipline in crowdfundings could
well come from insurers that-like underwriters in a registered public
offering-could decide whether disclosure and pricing to investors was
adequate to ensure the offering's success.
Insurers might also insist that securities firms and Internet portals-as a
condition to insuring the offerings in which they participate-provide
issuers with expertise on disclosure and pricing methods. No doubt, these
crowdfunding intermediaries will vet small business issuers, not only to
protect themselves from litigation risk, but also to compete and gain a
reputation as a purveyor of solid investment returns-or matching investors
and investment risk. To some extent, this is the function of insurers
242 Black, supra note 200, at 1014.
243 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 65 (2012) (arguing
that insurance pools risk and thus reduces it, thus making investors more willing to
take risks).
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providing private mortgage insurance, which demand that mortgage
originators adopt credit standards for borrowers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Crowdfunding comes with much promise and much danger. Helping
investors translate information into price-the fundamental role of
securities law-will inevitably fall on issuers and other participants in
crowdfunding offerings. Investors in such offerings, who the enabling
legislation assumes will be individuals with limited investment
sophistication, will have to be guided to understand how (and how much)
future returns and risks have present value.
Although the SEC will undoubtedly play a role in creating rules on
investor education and pricing disclosure, the liability scheme that emerges
for enforcing disclosure in crowdfunding offerings will become critical to
the new mechanism's success. Identifying what securities information is
material, which in turn depends on the sophistication of the investor and
any intermediaries, will become an important task for crowdfunding
regulators-the SEC, the self-regulatory organizations overseeing
crowdfunding intermediaries, and the courts and others charged with
enforcing the crowdfunding liability provisions.
Pricing disclosure--of the methods through which securities pricing
happens and of the assumptions underlying those methods-would seem to
be highly material. Accountability for mispriced crowdfunding offerings,
where the pricing disclosure failed to reveal the risk-return dynamic, will be
central to the new regime's success or failure. If crowdfunding turns out to
be an over-priced (even fraudulent) racket, we will have squandered an
opportunity to democratize our financial markets.
Given the heavy costs of private enforcement (whether through
individual or class litigation), public enforcement and even arbitration, it
seems that some ingenuity will be necessary for the crowdfunding industry
to reassure investors that there will be accountability for failed
crowdfunding offerings. A system of private insurance, borrowing to some
extent from the underwriting function in registered public offerings, may be
a solution.
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